
WORLD AFFAIRS REVIEW

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY

FALL 2007

ISSUE 2

SPONSORED BY:

Rutgers University Political Science Department
Aresty Research Center
Center for Global Security and Democracy

ARTWORK:

Logo Design — Laura E. Genson, of the Mason
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Cover art — hand-drawn depiction of *Hagia
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typesetted in Adobe Garamond created using Adobe Indesign CS version 4.0.4

PRINTED BY:

Print Line, Inc | 65-12 Brook Ave | Deer Park NY 11729



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SPECIAL THANKS TO | Professors Edward Rhodes, Dennis Bathory, and Michael Shafer *for their support and willingness to provide advice on putting together this issue of the journal.*

Dean Kerri Mahoney-Willson *for always keeping her office door open to us when we needed help navigating around the Rutgers system.*

Dr. Judy Kuriansky and Joan Levy *of the United Nations Department of Public Information / Non-Governmental Organization Conference for organizing the Student Journalism program that we gained so much experience from as a publication.*

Amy Linch *for constantly supporting us in the classroom and sending us some wonderful new people to work with.*

Allow me to begin by expressing my deepest respect for your decision to read. Not many undergraduates would choose to spend their leisure time poring over a research publication. No doubt you are now wondering whether it will prove to be a valuable use of your time. To say that more authoritative volumes are available is surely an understatement. In the absence of curricular incentives, finishing even a single article will be a heroic feat. Why read onward? Perhaps you believe that this letter will offer you some quick answers; I can offer nothing better than my own sincere opinions.

I believe that World Affairs Review is worth reading because it is a resource for self-reflection. Most of us have the good sense not to feel terribly disappointed when our work falls short of comparison with that of renowned scholars; it is the excellence of those whom we consider our equals that inspires us to excel. After two years of preparing marketing materials and mission statements for World Affairs Review, I have come to realize that our mandate is rather straightforward—to offer students of the social sciences at Rutgers access to the best work done by their peers, and to help them derive the fullest benefit from their own research endeavors.

If my choice of words perplexes you, and if you find it odd that I have not eulogized the research papers themselves, then I hope you will take the time to look through this journal. This is the work of your peers; it was reviewed and edited by your peers; now it is being presented to you. We are happy that you have chosen to read, but we want you to do more than that. We want you to share WAR with your friends and classmates. We want you to get in touch with the authors to offer your comments and exchange ideas. We want to hear feedback from you ourselves, and most of all, we want you to come back to us four months from now and pick up the next issue. If you are a new reader, I would advise you to stop wasting more time on this letter and go read!

From my old friends, the readers of our Spring 2006 issue, I sense the demand for an explanation. There is no sidestepping the fact that this second issue has been a long time coming. The release date has been pushed back so many times that I can hardly remember when we had wanted to release it in the first place. A number of explanations come to mind, but all of them sound trite. Conventional wisdom suggests that, when one's performance is under review, it is best to use someone else's words, and to be as vague as possible. As

an explanation for our hobbling production schedule this past year, I offer the words of Cicero, who wrote that, “Endless money forms the sinews of war.” Conventional wisdom also suggests making bad jokes.

Building a secure future for World Affairs Review has always been our foremost priority. Security means that our readers can expect a highly refined journal from us every semester, and that we will always strive toward our twin goals of publishing the best undergraduate research available, and encouraging an informed student debate on global affairs and international politics. With this second printing, we have taken the first step towards securing WAR. We have gained valuable experience within the organization, and without, we have gained legitimacy. Moving forward, our most pressing need is to forge a strong bond with the readership, which includes not only students, but also alumni, faculty, and administrators. My purpose in writing this letter has been to open a candid dialogue with our readers: to connect them to the staff and to the authors, and to link them with each other.

Before I close, I would like to recognize the people who were responsible for bringing you this journal. They are: Professor Michael Shafer, Director of the Center for Global Security and Democracy, our strongest supporter and a lifeline for me this past year; Dean Kerri Willson, Assistant Dean of Student Leadership and Involvement, for her constant advice and willingness to deal with the administrative headaches brought on by our printing arrangements; Dean Justine Hernandez Levine, Administrative Director at the Aresty Center for Undergraduate Research, for her organization’s fine work and its support of World Affairs Review; Dr. Judy Kuriansky and Joan A. Levy, for the opportunity to participate in the Student Journalism Program at the 59th Annual UN DPI/NGO Conference; Professor Dennis Bathory, Chair of the Political Science Department, for being a dear friend to this embattled Editor-in-Chief; Professor Edward Rhodes, for lending his advice and experience to us in times of need; and Amy Linch, who is always sending her wonderful students our way. Finally, I would like to thank my partners in crime, the staff of World Affairs Review, as well as Chinmay R. Rahalkar and Jae W. Lee, who lent their help and advice to the organization even after graduation, sometimes from the other side of the world.

On behalf of the entire staff at World Affairs Review, I thank you once again and wish you a pleasant read.

Respectfully yours,
Saad Padela

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IN IRAQ, DEMOCRACY IS THE ONLY OPTION

Eric Davis

Eric Davis is Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, and member of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ. He is author, most recently, of MEMORIES OF STATE: POLITICS, HISTORY AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN MODERN IRAQ. This article is a revised version of an essay which appeared in THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), and the NEWHOUSE PAPERS on September 17, 2006, and in the DAILY STAR (Beirut) on September 29, 2006.

His writings on Iraq can be accessed at: <http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/~davis>

Continued violence, the loss of almost 4,000 American lives, and the tremendous financial cost makes it understandable why the American public has lost confidence in efforts to help Iraq create a democracy following the overthrow of Saddam Husayn's Ba'athist regime in 2003. These factors also explain the increasing calls for a withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq. Unfortunately, many Americans do not realize what is at stake in Iraq. Possessing the world's third largest oil reserves, Iraq is a potential leader of the Arab world, being the only Arab country with oil, water, and extensive human capital in the form of a highly educated middle class. A failure to create a stable and functioning democracy, and the spiraling down of Iraq into chaos and anarchy would have disastrous consequences not just for Iraq, but for the entire Middle East. Iraq's collapse would have a domino effect on surrounding countries leading to more violence and instability in the region. It would create major threats to Western interests in the Middle East requiring commitments of human and material resources which would make the United States' current involvement pale by comparison.

These considerations notwithstanding, Americans have the right to ask whether an open-ended military involvement in Iraq constitutes sensible public policy. Have we not sacrificed enough American lives? Why are such large amounts of funds being spent on the Iraq war when important social needs in the United States are not being met? These are important questions. My response is twofold. First, the United States opened a Pandora's Box with its invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and has a moral obligation to complete what it began, no matter how ill-conceived initiating the Iraq war. Second, the options in Iraq have been portrayed in too narrow a fashion. On the one hand, the Bush administration has refused to clearly define the United States' mission in Iraq and neglected to address non-military strategies for bringing the war to a successful conclusion. On the other hand, anti-war activists have portrayed the war as an effort of the Bush administration and "neo-conservative" ideologues to control the Middle East for United States business interests, particularly oil wealth, and to promote Israel's power in the region. Unfortunately, both of these perspectives are very narrow and only tell part of the story. More importantly, they ignore the true interests of the conflict, the Iraqi people. If the United States withdraws its troops in a precipitous fashion, there will be grave consequences for all Iraqis who seek a tolerant and democratic country, as well as for democratic forces throughout the Middle East.

What are our policy options in Iraq? There are three policies which the United States can pursue in Iraq: immediate or phased withdrawal of our troops, the division of Iraq into three mini-states which represent the country's three main ethnic groups, the Sunni Arabs, Shi'i Arabs and the Kurds, or

remaining in Iraq until its democratically elected government and society can be stabilized.

What would be the consequences of the immediate or phased withdrawal of American troops? A likely possibility is the creation of a Taliban type government in the Sunni Arab provinces of north-central Iraq, often referred to as the “Sunni triangle.” Already two radical Islamist organizations, al-Qai’da in the Valley of the Two Rivers (*al-Qai’da fi Wadi al-Nahrayn*), and the Islamic State of Iraq (*al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi-l-’Iraq*), are vying for power in the three provinces with large Sunni Arab populations: al-Anbar, Salah al-Din, and Diyala. Apart from these groups, former Ba’thists are seeking to take control of Sunni Arab areas, often in the guise of Islamist organizations which they have funded, e.g., Muhammad’s Army (*Jaysh Muhammad*). While there have been conflicts between elements of Saddam Husayn’s regime and radical Islamists, their taking control of north-central Iraq would provide a magnet to radical forces throughout the region who already use this area as a training ground for terrorist activities.

In the nine Shi’i provinces of the south, Iran already has strong influence, particularly through efforts to tie the local economy more closely to its own economy; for instance, by providing electricity, a large line of credit (\$1 billion) to the Iraqi government, and large amounts of consumer goods. A United States withdrawal from Iraq would enhance Iran’s influence in Iraq, particularly in the south. With this enhanced influence, Iran would be able to place greater political and economic pressure on Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf oil-producing states to the south, and Jordan to the west.

Iraq’s three Kurdish provinces in the north have been the most supportive of the United States’ efforts to stabilize Iraq. However, control of the Kurdish region by its two main political parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), run by the Barzani and Talabani clans respectively, has encouraged political opposition by Iraq’s Kurds, particularly youth. Part of this opposition has taken the form of the spread of radical Islamist organizations. A precipitous United States withdrawal from Iraq would encourage the spread of radical organizations, which have received help from Iran, to further attempt to destabilize the north.

Increased influence of armed radical forces in the Sunni Arab, Shi’i Arab and Kurdish areas of Iraq, as a result of a United States withdrawal, could lead to greater conflict both within each region and among all three regions. A seizure of power by radicals in any one area of Iraq would embolden radicals in surrounding countries to come to Iraq, and would encourage responses against these developments by the United States’ allies, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Arab Gulf oil producing states. Extensive instability in Arab Iraq might propel the Kurds to declare independence from the Arab south, which would

provoke Turkey to intervene in Iraqi Kurdistan. In short, a withdrawal, or significant reduction in United States forces, would lead to a dramatic rise in violence and chaos which neither supports Iraqi nor American interests.

Another option which has been proposed to end the violence in Iraq is the idea of dividing the country along ethnic lines into three separate autonomous regions (“soft partition”) or three largely independent mini-states (“hard partition”). Dividing Iraq’s ethnic groups would supposedly result in an end to the current violence, thus allowing American troops to leave Iraq. This proposal has no merit. First, as public opinion polls make clear, Iraqis do not want their country divided along ethnic lines. A *BBC/ABC* poll, conducted in March 2007, indicated that 94% of Iraqis surveyed reject the idea of dividing Iraq along ethnic lines. Second, separating Iraq’s ethnic groups, who live in mixed areas throughout the country and who are often intermarried, is logistically impossible. Third, were the country to be divided into three mini-states, the strong likelihood is that violence would increase, not decrease. For example, the two prominent Shi’i militias in the south, the Mahdi Army (*Jaysh al-Mahdi*) and the Badr Organization (*Munazamat Badr*), have long been opposed to one another and have fought on numerous occasions in the southern port city of Basra and elsewhere. An autonomous or independent Shi’i state in Iraq’s nine southern provinces would intensify efforts to control the region. With a weak or non-existent national army, and United States forces having withdrawn, there would be no outside force to quell the violence. Such a scenario would offer a strong incentive for outside forces, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, to become actively involved in Iraq’s internal affairs.

One could expect a similar increase in violence in the Sunni Arab mini-state as well. Already we see a coalition of some 40 tribes, called the al-Anbar Salvation Council (*Sahawat al-Anbar*) has attacked Islamic radical organizations that the Council feels have gained too much political and economic control in their region and that threaten the safety of their tribal compatriots. These tribes, which depend on military support from the United States, would also be placed in a much more difficult position should that military support be withdrawn. This tribal coalition, which represents the majority of public opinion in al-Anbar province that rejects extremist politics, would come under increased military pressure by the influx of more Islamist radicals once United States forces withdrew from Iraq.

It may be asked why the Iraqi army should not step in to quell any increase in violence which might occur following a withdrawal of United States forces. However, we need to remember that it was the Bush administration which decommissioned Iraq’s army, comprised of 385,000 men, in May 2003, depriving Iraq of the ability to defend itself. Effective armed forces are not created over night. The Iraqi army has been ill-equipped by the United States

(often preventing it from engaging much better armed insurgent and militia organizations), and still lacks the necessary training to take control of Iraqi territory. This constitutes one of the many examples of where the United States has the moral obligation of creating an effective Iraqi military which can defend Iraq before withdrawing from the country.

Equally important, the attempt to divide Iraq would lend support to the arguments of the “Arab street,” the large stratum of unemployed and discontented young people throughout the Middle East, who argue that there is a “United States-Zionist-Imperialist” conspiracy to divide the Arab-Muslim world into smaller political units so as to better control it. Apart from going against Iraqi public opinion, and being impossible to implement, adopting such a policy would undermine American influence throughout the Arab Middle East.

A third option is to strengthen Iraqi democracy by initiating policies which would lead to greater stability, offer Iraqis more hope in the future, and create an environment supportive of economic growth. Here the emphasis is on reconstruction, not the almost exclusive emphasis on military activity which has characterized Bush administration policy in Iraq. First we need to realize that the rise of sectarian political organizations, such as al-Qai'da in Iraq, and the Mahdi Army, are aberrations because Iraq does not have a history of sectarianism. The Iraqi nationalist movement, which flourished between 1920 and 1963, at which point the first Ba'athist regime seized power and repressed it, emphasized cross-ethnic cooperation and promoted civil society building. Iraq also has no tradition of Islamic radicalism. It was only following the collapse of Iraq's welfare state following the 1991 Gulf War that Islamist organizations began to offer the social services no longer provided by the Ba'athist state. With severe economic decline caused by the United Nations sanctions imposed on Iraq after the Gulf War, and the spread of corruption and increased repression by Saddam Hussein's regime, many Iraqis began to turn inward to religion and ethnic identities to escape the horrors of everyday life and in response to the collapse of national institutions, such as the public education system. In other words, the rise of sectarianism was caused by economic and political decay, not by inherent dislike of Iraq's main ethnic groups of one another.

Since the fall of the Ba'athist regime in 2003, there has been little job creation for young Iraqis. Most Iraqis in their 30s, 40s and older retained their employment in 2003, and some in these age categories have received considerable wage increases over the past 4 years. Because 65% of Iraq's population is under 25, stagnation in the job market has disproportionately affected young people, one of the main sources of recruits for Sunni insurgent organizations and Shi'i death squads. Large numbers of rural migrants,

responding to the continued decline of Iraq's agricultural sector, have also provided recruits for organizations promoting political violence in Iraq's urban areas.

A weak Iraqi economy, which is estimated to have an unemployment rate between 50–60%, has spawned another development that hinders the growth of a stable democracy, namely crime syndicates. Kidnapping and extortion, for example, have become major industries in post-Ba'athist Iraq. While during the fall of 2006, the Bush administration belatedly recognized the extent to which economic decay has been fueling sectarian violence in Iraq, it has yet to mount the type of major international initiative which could lead to serious reconstruction in Iraq.

When the United States faced severe economic problems and political instability during the Great Depression of the 1930s, President Franklin Roosevelt wisely initiated the New Deal in which the government took an active role in putting Americans back to work. Iraqis constantly tell me that an improvement in the economic situation would result in a significant decline in violence and crime. Thus one important way in which the US government could promote democracy in Iraq is to establish an economic reconstruction fund that could put unemployed Iraqis back to work. How might such a fund work?

With the United States already contributing a significant amount of funds to Iraq, and facing a large budget deficit, one idea would be for the American government to lobby its Arab oil-producing allies, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and the Arab Gulf oil-producers, who have benefited by recent increases in the price of oil, to make major contributions to such a fund. An economic reconstruction fund, which has an "Arab face," would not be subject to accusations that the United States was trying to "control" Iraq, thereby making the fund politically acceptable in Iraq.

Why would Arab oil-producers such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait be interested in contributing to such a fund? First, a failed state in Iraq, characterized by extensive violence and anarchy, constitutes a serious threat to Saudi Arabia and the entire Arab Gulf region by encouraging radicals in these countries. Saudi Arabia, for example, already faces its own domestic terrorist threat. Second, as noted above, an unstable Iraq would allow Iran to exploit this instability and extend its influence in Iraq. While it might be argued that Sunni Arab governments would be hesitant to donate funds to the Shi'i dominated government in Baghdad due to suspicions that it is sympathetic to Shi'i Iran, Iraq's Shi'is are, in fact, as suspicious of Iranian intentions in their country as are their Arab neighbors to the south. We need remember that Iraq's infantry, 90% of which was Shi'i, fought tenaciously against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. In short, Iraq's Shi'a are

Iraqis first and Shi'is second.

If the United States and other Arab allies could convince wealthy Arab oil-producers to contribute to a reconstruction fund, how might such a fund help put Iraq on the road to stability and democracy? Initially, the funds could be used to create *Public Works Administration* (PWA), *Civilian Conservation Corps* (CCC) and *Works Progress Administration* (WPA) type jobs reminiscent of the New Deal. Such jobs would replicate the *Commanders' Economic Response Program* (CERP), which the American military has used so successfully to quell political violence. CERP funds have created temporary jobs for men in areas characterized by high levels of insurgent activity, leading to a sharp decline in violence, gratitude on the part of those Iraqis put to work, and benefits to the local community, such as the removal of garbage and sewerage, filling potholes and paving roads, repairing schools and police stations, rebuilding sewer systems, drilling water wells, clearing irrigation canals, and building clinics.

Once violence began to decline following the implementation of a New Deal type program of job creation, the economic reconstruction fund could organize a second phase in which small economic projects would be promoted to provide sustainable employment. Bakeries, schools, new markets, expansion of hospitals, and construction work represent the type of activity that could immediately put large numbers of Iraqis in sustainable economic activity, which could both pump money into the economy and add to Iraq's "social capital," a concept which many social scientists claim is critical to any country's ability to engage in political and socioeconomic development.

One of the most significant benefits of this two-stage program would be the development of a new incentive structure with which to entice local leaders in Iraq's major cities and towns to compete for the distribution of economic largesse rather than engaging in political violence. Providing economic resources in kind (and not in the form of cash that could be used to purchase weapons) would act as an incentive to bring local leaders and notables into the economic reconstruction project. In return for their assistance in promoting economic stability, these leaders would receive a wide variety of goods and services which they could use to enhance their status in their respective communities. A new school, new medical technology for a local hospital, expanding orphanages, creating public parks, are all projects that local leaders could point to as bringing benefits to their communities.

The benefits of increased employment and economic growth would give Iraqis greater hope in the future. It would lower hostility to both the Iraqi government and United States forces in Iraq. A decline in violence would lead to a decrease in the loss of Iraqi and American lives. A prosperous and democratic Iraq could become a model for the Middle East, whose "silent majority," as public opinion polls consistently demonstrate, desperately wants

to substitute greater political freedom and economic prosperity for religious radicalism and authoritarian rule. Americans are right to be dissatisfied with the continued loss of American lives in Iraq and the tremendous burden Iraq places on our own financial resources. Pressing forward with a serious economic reconstruction program, with our Arab allies providing the bulk of the funds, offers hope for a more rapid transition to a democratic Iraq, increased political stability in the Middle East, as well as the return American troops back home.

NATION-BUILDING AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:

Can comparative analysis from the Philippines
lend insight for today's policies in Iraq?

Katie Worthington
Political Science
Class of 2007

The release of Pentagon Directive No. 3000 on December 13, 2005 marked a watershed in the course of American foreign policy. The directive raises the priority of use of combat troops for nation-building activities to equal footing with that of major combat operations, and orders U.S. commanders to incorporate postwar stability missions into every war plan. Prior to the commencement of future operations, “nation-building teams,” including both military commanders and civilians in the State Department, will be created. This policy represents an essential change in posture towards nation-building activities by the armed forces, which have by and large striven to relegate their operations to conventional warfare and to eschew tertiary engagements. Air Force Col. J. Scott Norwood, the Pentagon’s deputy director of international negotiations and multilateral affairs, says he remembers “intense debates ten or fifteen years ago on whether military operations other than war ought to be core mission, and there was a huge divide.” Now, says Norwood, “There is no question it is.” The present mire in Iraq is an unpleasant confirmation that, despite the United States’ preponderance of military power, conventional war represents but half the battle to secure U.S. objectives abroad. Rather, it is the postwar peace and reconstruction operation that will “consume the lion’s share of operational resources and determine the ultimate success of the mission” (Joyner 2005).

Nonetheless, as the State Department has recently affirmed, nation-building activities cannot be conducted properly in an area that has yet to be secured. A recent draft planning document from the State Department asserts that the first priority in a nation-building plan should be to secure the area and establish political reconciliation. If the criterion of military security remains unfulfilled during the reconstruction phase, then Washington is bound to “suffer major political repercussions by making promises that cannot be kept” (Brinkley 2006). In order to avoid future setbacks, the State Department appears to be moving away from the practice of drawing an artificial line between combat operations and nation-building activities, and instead coming to recognize them as part of an incremental progression of “clearing, holding, and building.”

In the four years since the fall of Baghdad, it has become clear that, although the U.S. military has the power to dominate opposing armies in a conventional war, the biggest challenge in a nation-building campaign lies in the aftermath of the military struggle. At the same time that the military is taking a greater interest in nation-building strategies for use in its war plans, those in the State Department are trying to uphold the importance of a straightforward military doctrine—that the conflict area must be secured before anything within it can be rebuilt. Indeed, the pitfalls of U.S. policy in Iraq have arisen from a failure to

devise a cohesive postwar plan which would have facilitated appropriate security in the initial phases following the ouster of Saddam (Dobbins 2004).

Nation-building operations in Iraq have been rife with complications and unforeseen consequences. Indeed, each project hinges upon a multitude of factors, making the ramifications of policy difficult to predict. However, as the U.S. becomes increasingly mired in Iraq and the Middle East, policymakers would be wise to heed the lessons of the United States' past experiences with nation-building. Rigorous appraisal of these ventures evinces a surfeit of counterinsurgency and nation-building tactics which have been employed in the past. Analyzing the results of these strategies can help us eschew those tactics which resulted in failure, while policies which yielded successful development projects may be brought under further consideration for adaptation and application in Iraq.

The post-World War II reconstruction of Germany and Japan are generally regarded to have been the United States' first venture in nation-building (Dobbins 2005). However, such an assessment overlooks the United States' experience in the Philippines between 1898 and 1935. The Philippine-American War was a showcase of American military superiority, but when resistance forces responded by receding into the civilian population, the United States was left in the precarious position of managing a new territory while simultaneously confronting a virile and amorphous insurgency.

Study of the nation-building experience in the Philippines provides an important collection of lessons for our present nation-building endeavors. While experiences from the U.S. involvement in the Philippines are most frequently cited as an illustration of imperialistic and flawed tactics in U.S. nation-building, minimal analysis has been conducted to take note of the positive lessons which might be gleaned from this endeavor. During a time in which proactive recommendations are in such short supply, it would be foolish to throw away the baby with the bathwater and neglect the lessons offered by this historical experience.

Analysis of several individualized components of the nation-building experience in the Philippines yields advice for proactive steps which might be made to stabilize Iraq and effectuate social change conducive to democracy. This paper shall focus on how the United States foreshadowed today's "clear, build, and hold" strategy between 1898 and 1935 by: 1) effectively recognizing the need to instill security from the outset of the occupation 2) taking swift action to delegate local control to the Filipinos once security was established, and 3) undertaking a range of social engineering programs in an effort to introduce democratic values and encourage the Filipinos to accept the legitimacy of the new government. The paper will then extend these model policies for comparison with analogous policies in Iraq—opening the door for possible

incorporation of lessons learned from the successful employment of these strategies in the Philippines.

II. THE PHILIPPINES: A CASE STUDY IN U.S. NATION-BUILDING

Appraisal of the United States' strategic interests in the Philippine nation-building endeavor is necessary to place its efforts in the appropriate context. The Spanish-American War in 1898 marked the inception of a new, assertive, and expansionary attitude for American foreign policy. An unexpected bonus acquisition from the Treaty of Paris, the Philippines provided American administrators and military governors with a fabulous testing ground for this new role. However, Americans were divided over what to do with the territory. Although many Americans denounced European Imperialism at the inception of their "splendid little war" against Spain, most Republicans pressed for annexation of the Philippines (Hay 2005). The islands offered a gateway to Asian markets, where the British, Germans, and Japanese had already established colonies. However, unlike the European Imperialists, the United States had ample amounts of natural resources and a glut of cheap labor—provided by an influx of immigration from Europe—to drive its economy. As a result of these fortuitous circumstances, "Congress could afford to appear ethical" by barring American citizens from acquiring landholdings in the Philippines (Karnow 1989, 19). Tony Smith finds these circumstances to be sufficiently convincing to conjecture that, "Certainly it was not strategic considerations that motivated the American conquest... ultimately, it was considerations of national pride and purpose that were the primary (though not exclusive) motivations of American policy with respect to the Philippines" (Smith 1994, 41). Indeed, President McKinley agonized over the decision, thinking very much along the lines of "the twin currents of Protestant Piety and American jingoism that defined the turn of the century zeitgeist" (Boot 2002, 104). Thus, the impetus for the U.S. decision to move forward with the occupation of the Philippines was influenced not by economic or conventional imperialist motivations, but rather from the desire to establish an independent and democratically-oriented government that would serve as an obliging partner for U.S. interests in the region.

This paper seeks to focus on the merits of proceeding with counterinsurgency operations before delving into nation-building projects. However, before narrowing to such a focus, one must recognize that the admirable foresight of those administering America's first major exploit in nation-building was also checkered by hubris, racism, and downright barbarity. Included in the gamut of tactics employed by American troops in the Philippines was a ready resort

to torture as a tool to obtain confessions from suspected insurgents. Those suspected of harboring information were often hung by their thumbs and over lit fires, dragged around by galloping horses, and subjected to the infamous “water cure.”

However, despite these significant and damnable errors, the endeavor in the Philippines was not devoid of merit. From the outset, the McKinley Administration embraced the idea of nation-building in the Philippines and resolved “to build up the vast places desolated by war and long years of misgovernment... to make these people Providence has brought within our jurisdiction feel that it is their liberty and not our power, their welfare and not our gain, we are seeking to enhance” (Richardson 1903). Indeed, “during its half century of colonial tutelage, America endowed the Filipinos with universal education, a common language, public hygiene, roads, bridges, and, above all, republican institutions” (Karnow 1989, 13). Manuel Luis Quezon’s outburst of nationalist frustration—“Damn the Americans! Why don’t they tyrannize us more?”¹ suggests that the American administration in the Philippines was generally well received.

A. ESTABLISHING INITIAL ORDER

In the Philippines, the balance between nation-building and counterinsurgency—when brought into conflict—would be tipped towards counterinsurgency activities before nation-building activities would commence (Gates 1973, 19). In his infamous General Order No. 100, issued in December 1900, General Arthur MacArthur declared that guerrilla warfare was contrary to “the customs and usages of war,” and those engaged in it must “divest themselves of the character of soldiers, and if captured are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war.” The proclamation thereby opened the door for a vast array of unsavory methods of identifying and interrogating Filipino insurgents. The order also made it clear that civil works projects were secondary in priority to “punitive measures against those who continue to resist” (Deady 2005, 60). However, appraisal of the campaign in its totality evinces that, “Americans found legal means to separate the population from the guerillas and did so while acting more humanely than the generally accepted standards of the time,” (Deady 2005, 53) and, “in contrast to the Europeans, they were uniquely benign” (Karnow 1989, 18). Although provisions of General Order No. 100 allowed for suspension of civil rights, deportation, and summary execution, the Order was subsequently adopted by European armies as a model

1. Manuel Luis Quezon was the first U.S.-recognized Filipino President, though others posit the revolutionary Emilio Aguinaldo as the first. Because of the generally fair treatment and ambitious social engineering tactics undertaken by the American occupiers, local patriots encountered roadblocks in their efforts to rally Filipinos against the Americans. President Quezon grew frustrated with his constituents’ ready embrace of the American occupiers.

for humane treatment of conquered peoples (Deady 2005, 62). Indeed, it has been argued that, “as disturbing as some treatment of Filipinos may be to modern sensibilities, American soldiers generally acted benevolently [when considered in a historical context]” (Deady 2005, 63). Furthermore, once the exacting counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines had run its full course, the atmosphere of security it created allowed for the implementation of long-term social engineering measures. Thus, the Philippine counterinsurgency experience conveys the general principle that the United States must recognize the insurgency and address it before attempting to proceed with any complex social engineering or reconstruction programs.

B. SWIFT DELEGATION OF LOCAL AUTHORITY

One of the most pivotal foundations of success for the United States’ endeavor in the Philippines lay in its swift and concerted efforts to divest control of local government to the Filipinos. While the territory was under military tutelage, “American military governors generally adopted a ‘live and let live’ program that granted local governments considerable freedom” (Stein 2000). Local elections were held as early as 1899, imbuing the Filipinos with a sense of control over their hometowns in the face of a foreign occupation and helping to dissipate the inevitable resentment of a population towards their foreign occupiers. In so doing, the Americans demonstrated credibility towards their claim of disinterest in any lasting hold on the government. Administrative decisions would not be adjudicated by a tenderfoot American, unfamiliar with the customs and penchants of the local area, but rather, by a familiar face and fellow countryman. In implementing such a system, Americans avoided becoming bogged down in small-town disputes and vexing locals with botched decisions or cross-cultural faux pas. Placing local authority in the hands of the Filipinos and assigning them with accountability for the conduct of justice in their own area instilled a great deal of agency among the people in their perceptions of, and attitudes towards, their future government (Deady 2005, 59).

The Jones Act of 1916—providing an official pledge from the U.S. Congress to grant the Philippines their independence, served to enhance confidence in the autonomous local government. In fact, “the political atmosphere was profoundly altered when American leaders wisely accepted the demand for independence as a legitimate issue” (Miller 1982, 264). Although the date of transition was conspicuously unfixed, the act served as a writ of assurance for Filipinos that, despite its role as an occupying power, the U.S.’s ultimate goal was to assist them in developing their own sovereign country.

A significant stride towards divesting complete control to the Filipinos was

made in 1913, as Americans undertook the process of “Filipinization” of the bureaucracy. Within eight years of the adoption of this policy, 13,143 of the 13,757 bureaucrats working in the American governing administration were Filipino (Smith 1994, 46). By 1921, fifty-six of the top sixty-nine government posts would be occupied by native Filipinos—powerful evidence that this process of Filipinization was authentic. Under the occupation system, real authority—not just grunt work and paper shuffling—was entrusted to the people. Entrusting the staffing of the American governing apparatus to Filipinos not only enhanced the ability of the bureaucracy to handle local affairs and needs efficiently, but also became “an indispensable element in search of national identity and nation-building” (Jumaani 2000). Citizens could appeal to friendly and familiar faces when dealing with the government. Policy would be crafted by people familiar with local issues and terrain. Indeed, T.E. Lawrence recognized a truth in nation-building uncommon in his age of imperialism—that it is “better to let them do it imperfectly than to do it perfectly yourself, for it is their country, their way, and your time is short” (Barber 2003).

Nevertheless, however motivated the United States may have been to grant local control to the Filipinos, the success of this divestiture was contingent upon the Filipinos’ participation in the new government. Thus, Americans adopted the somewhat crude yet pragmatic policy of offering “carrots” to foster the active participation of the entire community in the American-style municipal government, and “employed political power to make cooperation lucrative” (Deady 2005, 58). In exchange for community participation in the American-devised municipal government, Filipinos would receive a considerable degree of local administrative autonomy. This appeal to self-interest in what became known as the “tutored transition,” was based upon the idea that once “invested” in the system, Filipinos could then come to appreciate the intrinsic rewards of self-government and proceed to advance democracy of their own accord in an “incremented transition” (Smith 1994, 46).

The good faith demonstrated by the devolution of authority culminated in the direction of the Philippines’ first independent national elections in 1907. The practice of offering increased autonomy in exchange for security and good behavior extended beyond the elections, as the Filipinos were told that if they remained “good” for two years after the conduction of a census, they would be able to elect a legislature. The Filipinos rose to the challenge offered by the Americans—there was indeed a cessation of violence, and two years after the census of 1905, elections for the national legislature were held.

However, American interests were not served in the election. The confrontational Nationalista party won sweeping victories, portending a Philippine government that would endorse policy frequently at odds with U.S.

preferences. That the U.S. nevertheless stood by the results of this election spoke volumes of the America's commitment to democracy, and convinced many Filipinos that the Americans were genuine in their purported intention to eventually grant them complete autonomy. In standing by the results of an election of a government that was not ideally suited towards their interests, Americans vested Filipinos with a sense of agency and impressed on them the notion that change could be achieved through the ballot box (Smith 1994, 45). Further justification of violent insurgent activity would be difficult to achieve if grievances could be addressed through the vote. Thus, delegation of local control and conduct of national elections—even if the resulting government might not be of the ideal composition for U.S. interests—encourages the population to invest their trust and their energies in the new government and serves to undermine reasons for support of an insurgency.

C. FOCUS SHIFTS TO SOCIAL ENGINEERING

Following the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo, the leader of the nationalist insurgency, the Administration accelerated the extant “benevolent” programs on the islands. Neophytes in colonial occupation that they were, members of the American administration in the Philippines—notably Generals Otis and MacArthur, as well as Governor William Howard Taft—displayed impressive foresight in recognizing that not only were short term tactics essential to undermining the insurgency, but that social engineering projects were also needed to achieve the crux of a nation-building objective—fostering long-term stability and social progress. Once the U.S. military secured its hold in the Philippines, administrators resolved to proceed with a plan of nation-building and democracy development on the islands.

General Elwell Otis was convinced that the vast majority of Filipinos would be loyal to the Americans if they were treated properly, and encouraged his subordinates to undertake projects in school building, government organization, and public works (Gates 1973, 142). Even General MacArthur—the author of the stringent General Order No. 100—found education to be a key element of the success of the nation-building process. MacArthur believed that “the archipelago must be submerged immediately under a tidal wave of education,” and throughout his tenure, “investment in education remained a top priority” (Gates 1973, 143).

The American credence in the necessity of an informed electorate in a functioning democracy served as the initial motivation to instill an education system; however, as the military proceeded to establish schools, Americans found that the education system also served to undermine the support for the insurgency. Indeed, “because the Filipinos wanted it and the Americans

entered into it so willingly and enthusiastically, the army's school work generated a great deal of goodwill between the military and the Filipinos who came in contact with each other in the municipalities" (Deady 2005, 55). The public schools were generally popular among the people, and "the students themselves genuinely liked American teachers" (Gates 1973, 87). Major John Parker recognized that the eighteen soldiers he charged to work as school teachers in Laguna did far more to eliminate the insurgency than if he had used them conventionally (May 1980, 107). Inspired, Parker's wife subsequently undertook the responsibility of running schools for over 2,000 students, a project Major Parker claimed did more to diffuse tensions in the country than "a 1000 men" (May 1980, 107).

Indeed, by 1907, thanks to the efforts of progressives such as Captain Albert Todd, who envisioned a system of a complete liberal education, the school system implemented in the Philippines encompassed a program of primary, intermediate, and secondary schools (Deady 2005, 62). Americans introduced new textbooks, constructed thousands of new schoolhouses, and trained thousands of Filipino teachers. The schools also won friends for the United States, as they "represented a road to advancement and functioned as an agency of social engineering" (Gates 1973, 47).

Another critically important contribution of the American occupiers which elicited citizen participation in the government involved fostering the concept of a free press. The Filipinos embraced this new freedom with an intellectual vivacity and infused the public discourse with healthy debate—a significant counter to the incipient fear and anarchic misinformation spread during the insurrection. The tradition of freedom of the press that took root in the Philippines would become the unrivaled exemplar for free press in Asia for decades to come (May 1980, 123). This strong tradition continues, as the Philippine press stands as one of the few institutions willing to confront the endemic corruption, illegal gambling, and drug running prevalent in the country today (Smith 1994, 45).

Although it is replete with flaws generated by inexperience, hubris, and racism, the American experience in the Philippines between 1898 and 1935 does include certain policies worth reconnoitering as our troops become increasingly committed to nation-building activities. Numbered among these commendable endeavors are American administrators' recognition of the need to establish security before undertaking nation-building activities—and quickly delegating local control to Filipinos once this security was established, working towards an eventual "Filipinization" of the bureaucracy, and cultivating a sense of confidence and trust in the new government by encouraging citizen participation through such methods as fostering a free press and institution of an educational system. The subsequent sections of this paper shall explore how

the lessons of these strategies may be adapted to modern times and applied to the situation in Iraq.

III. IRAQ—APPLICATION OF THE LESSONS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO CURRENT STRATEGIES IN IRAQ

Nearly four years after the toppling of Saddam's Baathist regime, the United States is more committed in Iraq than ever before. Just as in the Philippines, the U.S. military faces the daunting task of confronting an unexpected and formidable insurgency, as well as managing unanticipated logistical and administrative post-conflict complications and commitments. Securing the desired end-state for Iraq requires Americans to not only root out the insurgency, but also win the "hearts and minds" of a conquered, occupied, diverse, and factionalized people. The need for effective and innovative social engineering policies as a component of nation-building is critical, because "a strategy that relies on killing insurgents may never eliminate the insurgency itself, whose ranks can be filled by new recruits from a supportive population—an outcome made more, not less, likely if the government employs a heavy hand during conventional operations" (Preston 2004). However, by applying our isolated analysis of the several social engineering tactics employed in the Philippines, we can glean a number of promising strategies for nation-building and social engineering approaches in Iraq.

A. "CLEARING"—ESTABLISHING SECURITY AS A PREREQUISITE FOR NATION-BUILDING

Americans recognized the need to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqis from the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, operating on the memory of the Iraqi forces obsequiously folding during the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. officials made too great a presumption that they would be widely recognized as liberators upon entering Iraq, and it was the "the insurgents [who] understood better than the Americans that the battle was for the loyalty of the population" (Benashel 2005). As the insurgency took root in the power vacuum following the removal of Saddam, insurgents worked to create "an atmosphere of intimidation, insecurity, and despair" in hopes of undermining support for the new government amongst the civilian population (Packer 2005, 306). New police recruits were butchered to prove to the population that the new government was too weak to protect them. Fear set in among the Iraqis, and by the time the Americans gained control over the initial post-war anarchy, many Iraqis were reluctant to place themselves and their families at risk of reprisal from insurgents by cooperating with the Americans. According to

Senator Joseph P. Biden, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S. military now lacks the influence to prevent the insurgents from “intimidating the fence-sitters, who are too afraid to take a chance on behalf of their government” (Biden 2005).

The adverse situation in Iraq we are now dealt evinces the vital importance of establishing security before a positive relationship can be cultivated with the people. Failure to establish such order in the wake of the conventional victory is the primary factor accountable for the complications in postwar Iraq, and, according to Jeffrey Dobbins, is the cause underpinning the repeated failure of U.S. nation-building in the past decade (Dobbins 2004). In the Philippines, military security was established in an area before nation-building or infrastructural projects were commenced. However, in Iraq, the immediate fallout from the collapse of the regime was widely and mistakenly perceived as benign looting, and the dearth of action taken to secure the area squandered the prime time to set a systematic tenor to the transition.

The situation in Iraq is made all the more frustrating by the fact that, prior to the invasion, the United States devised a plan for implementing swift counterinsurgency measures in the wake of the invasion, a plan that promised to both establish security on the ground and avoid the indiscretions of the Philippine model. General Anthony Zinni devised “Desert Crossing”—a plan providing for the contingency of occupying a post-conflict, post-Saddam Iraq in 1999. Desert Crossing established a civilian governing council in each of Iraq’s eighteen provinces, and included provisions that made plans addressing social engineering, protection of infrastructure, sealing of borders, both humanitarian and political crises, the economy, and social issues such as women’s rights (Ricks 2003). These plans were left with General Tommy Franks, and according to General Zinni, ought to have been incorporated with the military plan. However, the Pentagon surmised that structured planning was not applicable for “Phase IV”² operations addressing the political ramifications of the military action, and Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced without ever having “settled on a strategy for defeating the insurgency and achieving their broader objectives” of establishing a free and independent Iraq (Krepinevich 2005).

However, the transition between Phase III and IV—that between counterinsurgency and reconstruction—is variegated throughout the country. Even within a specific neighborhood, it continues to be nearly impossible to delineate the boundaries of these two phases, as “engineers may be tasked to conduct cordon-and-search missions under combat conditions one day and provide construction support for schools and hospitals the next” (Koenig 2004, 22). The initial blueprint for Operation Iraqi Freedom foresaw this condition,

2. Phases I through III dealt primarily with military operations against Iraq, culminating in Phase III’s removal of Saddam Hussein and the Baathist regime from power. Phase IV addressed the reconstruction of Iraq and peacekeeping.

and recognized that a “rolling transition” between Stage III combat operations and Stage IV reconstruction would be one of the “defining characteristics of the campaign” (Koenig 2004, 20). However, this blurring of responsibilities and mission objectives levies an incredible test of fortitude and resilience on our troops besides inhibiting efforts at reconstruction and various social engineering measures. Frequently, troops are shuffled between operations, as “some units that violently executed offensive operations suddenly, and in some cases immediately, find themselves supporting humanitarian relief operations, then rapidly returning to the offensive” (Heer 2004). When insurgents are dispersed among the civilian population, a soldier must remain in combat mentality when traveling through civilian areas, running into what historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. derided as “the fatal fallacy of liberal theory of counterinsurgency—” the difficulty in balancing the requisite force against insurgents without generating resentment among the civilian population (Gates 1973, 129). As our troops are being asked to pursue nation-building and social engineering projects while simultaneously handling combat situations, the U.S. military grapples with “the inevitable tension between obtaining security for one’s troops and winning popular support” (Packer 2005, 446). Indeed, it remains unclear whether the two tactics of nation-building and counterinsurgency can be waged simultaneously without compromising the other.

In the Philippines, General Arthur MacArthur was able to pursue an aggressive counterinsurgency policy because he was unconcerned with the refinements of the “liberal theories” of counterinsurgency. General Order No. 100 made it clear that counterinsurgency and military operations had first priority in MacArthur’s administration of the Philippines (Brinkley 2006). Although MacArthur was prone to certain excesses in his tactics to confront the insurgents, he should be commended for recognizing the true nature of the problem and taking the proper steps to address it. As late as November 2004—nearly a year and a half after the fall of Baghdad—the U.S. military did not have a viable plan in place to address the insurgency on the ground (Biden 2005). The lag time generated by this lack of planning provided the insurgency with an incubation period to deepen its influence and capitalize on the power vacuum by undermining civilian trust in the American-sponsored institutions. Now, having finally recognized the necessity of pursuing a proactive post-war presence, American troops are fighting an uphill battle to win over a soured populace from the clutches of a deeply entrenched insurgency. The significant nation-building efforts undertaken in Iraq have been offset by surges of violence and insecurity throughout the country. Andrew S. Natsios, the director of USAID through January 2006 concedes that, “we set it up to fail” in Iraq, as “a large-scale reconstruction program could never succeed in a hostile environment” (Dobbins 2004). Indeed, reconstruction has been seriously

hamstrung as a result, leading to not only a strain in resources—twenty-five to forty percent of the \$3.5 billion spent thus far on reconstruction in Iraq has been channeled to providing security around jobsites—but, more significantly, hampering U.S. troops from focusing on the interests of the needy civilian population as they are left to combat a potent and nebulous insurgency (Diamond 2004). U.S. forces have been forced to diverge from their attempts at nation-building and instead employ harsh counterinsurgency measures, and, four years later, “the U.S. must now help local leaders fight and win a counterinsurgency campaign before nation-building reforms can take root (Krepinevich 2005).

B. “HOLDING”—ENGENDERING TRUST IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT THROUGH SWIFT DELEGATION OF LOCAL CONTROL

The system of gradually divesting local control in the Philippines served to both undermine the insurgency and build a relationship with the people. Adaptation of this model to Iraq provides local Iraqis with powerful incentives to cooperate in the reconstruction effort. The U.S. took steps very early in the occupation to convey to the Iraqis that they had come to deliver a new type of freedom and self-determination, yet in many cases the U.S. has been cautious to cede control to the Iraqi nationals. When L. Paul Bremer came to the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in May 2003, he embraced a series of policies which disenfranchised many Iraqis from the new system. With the Iraqi army already abolished, Bremer embraced a policy of purging all former members of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party from the new government—including public schools and colleges. Although demilitarization of existing armed forces is a natural action to take when consolidating a conquered territory, the U.S. may have erred in embracing a policy of absolutism towards former Ba’ath party members. In a situation where leadership experience and administrative skills were in short supply, the U.S. should have been more careful to avoid estranging the only group of Iraqis to possess these qualities in the past forty years. Furthermore, Paul Bremer allowed several months to pass before signing the legal order required to delineate the authority of local governing councils. This delay retarded the growth of local government and “prevented [the local governments] from developing into a power center that could compete with the militias and the insurgents for popular support” (Council for Foreign Relations 2006). Into this power vacuum created by the absence of government authority stepped “insurgents, foreign fighters, neighbors like Iran and Syria, and other opportunists [to fill] the breach—” directly leading to the entrenchment of the insurgency which destabilizes Iraq today (Diamond 2004). This group of trained, aggressive,

well-connected, and sour young men had little to do but brood and serve as recruits for the budding insurgency (Lugar 2006). Had these idle hands been put to work towards securing the future of their own communities, perhaps there would have been fewer recruits for the insurgents.

Bremer eventually set in motion a seven-step political process that included the drafting of a constitution and the organization of incremented stages of national elections. The ultimate objective of Bremer's plan was to pass complete sovereignty on to the Iraqis. The current Iraqi Governing Council is composed of a promising "diverse mixture of Iraqis—including recently returned exiles, tribal leaders, women, religious Muslim conservatives, and secular political leaders" (Packer 2005, 410). Thirteen seats are allotted to Iraq's Shiite majority, while twelve seats of the council are divided amongst Iraq's main minorities—Sunnis, Kurds, Assyrians, and Turkmen—a heartening step towards insuring that delegation of authority is handed down to an accurate representation of the Iraqi population. However, the promise of this policy is dampened by the question of whether it was introduced too late. During the throes of insurgency in 2004, CPA officials began to note in retrospect that their biggest mistake had been the failure to hold local elections earlier, reinforcing how pivotal it is to ensure that administrative capacities are divested to local authorities with as much alacrity as security interests will permit (Packer 2005, 144).

Genuine attempts have been made at inspiring active participation of the populace in Iraq's new government, yet room for improvement remains, and it would be useful to review several of the tactics employed during the Philippine "tutored transition" for practicable strategies in Iraq. Although rather crass, the Philippine "carrots and sticks" model of offering incentives in exchange for participation in the new government may similarly encourage participation in Iraq. Indeed, such a model was suggested by Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dick Lugar, who recognizes the tribal nature of Iraqi society and recommends devising U.S. policy that works with this structure, allocating "walking-around money" be awarded to community leaders to spend at their discretion, and thereby giving local communities the responsibility for their own progress (Liberi 2006).

Such a plan would build upon existing programs reflecting the United States' willingness to invest in non-conventional projects. In 2004, the Bush Administration allocated over half a billion dollars into "democracy building programs" designed to prepare the population for the upcoming elections. Programs engendered by these funds were of the likes of the National Democratic Institute, an organization run by an unarmed and non-confrontational Midwest political campaign staffer, and dedicated to teaching Iraqis the rudiments of grassroots organization and negotiation skills. These

small-scale efforts can and have been very valuable on a micro-level, despite the scorn they have met on the macro-level. From the perspective of Marina Ottoway of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the efforts of the NDI are “bravely doing something that is completely futile” (Kissinger 2005). However, although they may seem fruitless in the face of the potent challenges presented in Iraq, Ottoway is unjustified in speaking against these kinds of micro-projects. Within the Western mindset, it may seem that the notions of democracy are inherent principles. However, the social structure of Iraq and its Muslim culture invoke a different set of principles, creating a fundamental disconnect in understanding between the worldviews of Iraqis and Americans. In order for the Western concept of democracy to take root in the Middle East, open and candid dialogue must flow between the two cultures. Over the years of Saddam’s regime, Iraqis had inured to the status quo, and feared that any form of personal initiative would result in extermination (Filkins 2005). It will take proactive cultural exchange to overcome the fatalism and passive acceptance and inspire all Iraqis to participate actively in the formation of their new government. Certain Iraqi concepts will require revision, and certain elements of our concept of democracy will need to be reconsidered in the context of the Arab world and Iraq. Efforts such as those of the National Democratic Institute represent the type of highly refined, locally-oriented efforts necessary in achieving such a goal.

As was the case in the Philippines, the successful conduct of national elections was a defining moment in early history of post-Saddam Iraq. It established the legitimacy of the articulated intentions behind the American occupation. Indeed, the success of elections for the National Assembly in January 2005 has been “one of the key successes of Iraq and of the government and the people itself” in the occupation to date (Packer 2005, 323). The success of the elections lies in the fact that they were the culmination of a collective effort and spirit of the Iraqis themselves. This independent expression of national will greatly enhanced the Iraqi’s sense of self-efficacy and served as “the indispensable first phase of a political evolution from military occupation to political legitimacy” (O’Connor and Hoffman 2005).

Insurgents recognized this principle, and concentrated the whole of their efforts on preventing the elections from taking place. Ranking terrorist organizations funneled resources and fighters into Iraq to destabilize the region, and were successful in causing multiple postponements of the election date. As the impending date of elections drew near in January 2005, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi declared war on the Iraqi elections—claiming democracy to be an evil form of polytheism which replaced God with “rejectionist pig” politicians. Leaflets scattered around Baghdad threatened to “wash the streets of Baghdad with the voters’ blood” (Packer 2005, 323). Yet, in spite of these savage threats,

Iraqis came in numbers to voice their will at the polls—boasting an impressive turnout rate of 58%.

The success and pride surrounding the elections stems from the fact that the accomplishment was not that of the United States' administration, the CPA governing authority, or an ensconced group of Iraqi elites, but the people themselves. Indeed, foreign troops were generally unseen on election day, and “when Iraqis went to vote, the achievement was finally their own” (Packer 2005, 323). A sense of national achievement bolstered Iraqi pride in their new, authentic, indigenous, and autonomous government. As was the case in the Philippines, the party preferred by the United States was not elected. Rather than elect Iyad Allawi, the secular candidate and current interim Prime Minister, most Shi'a adhered to the directives of their religious leaders in what was their first chance to voice their own opinion. Although they had been hoping to establish a separation of church and state, or perhaps of mosque and state, the United States stood by the results of the Iraqi elections, thereby affirming the ideology and lessons of democracy they so espoused. Indeed, the United States recognized that “showing the world the values on which American society is based and abiding by these values in our foreign policy is the best way to conduct effective public diplomacy. It's also the best way to spread democracy” (O'Connor and Hoffman 2005).

C. “BUILDING”—PROMOTING STABILITY THROUGH SOCIAL ENGINEERING

The crucial role of education in nation-building and social engineering was widely recognized in plans for post-invasion Iraq; from the outset, administrators appreciated the pivotal role of education in a social engineering and nation-building plan.

In October 2003, as schools opened for the first time since the fall of Saddam, news teams from ABC and Time surveyed schools in Northern, Central, and Southern Iraq to rank the conditions of school systems in each of the respective regions. In the aggregate, schools were found to have improved in each region, with more Iraqi children attending school than ever before (ABC News 2003). Accounting for these improvements are dramatic increases in schoolteacher's salaries—a teacher who under Saddam earned the equivalent of four dollars a month, now earns one hundred and fifty dollars a month (Packer 2005, 351). Mass reconstruction has improved the structural integrity of the schools themselves, and the Ba'athist curriculum has been replaced with a new program of study and textbooks.

Enrolling children in school serves a practical purpose—“it means the kids are off the streets and they're back in school and they're learning. They're no longer a burden; they're not out there playing in the mine fields; they're not

out there where they can be shot, killed, maimed by U.S. forces under their operations. It means that life is beginning to return to normal” (Pollack 2003). Indeed, Senator Joseph P. Biden, a frequent critic of the Bush Administration’s policy in Iraq as the former ranking Democratic member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—has conducted an independent assessment of the U.S. endeavors in Iraq and believes “there’s a direct correlation... between Iraqis supporting their government and children going to school” (Biden 2005).

Wayne Woolley, a correspondent for the *Star-Ledger* who spent September through November 2005 embedded with a Civil Affairs unit in Iraq, also found that establishment of a decent educational system made substantial inroads towards establishing a good relationship with local people—especially Sunni Muslims, who Woolley found to have a more Westernized perspective on education than the Shi’ites (Woolley 2006). Many Sunnis had received higher education in the West prior to Saddam’s rule, and were very concerned about their children’s education. Given that a great proportion of the insurgency hails from Sunni areas, the importance of continuing to make progress with civilians through education becomes all the more critical—a fact that the military seems to be cognizant of and acting upon, as Woolley noted that the preponderance of the educational efforts were geared towards Sunni areas.

However, like other aspects of social engineering, the success of the education system in Iraq is tainted by the lack of security. Bombings and attacks still threaten the children and teachers, and a tinge of fear strains the learning environment. For instance, Woolley recounts an experience when one of his units delivered a collection of donated coloring books to an Iraqi school. The teacher “flipped out” when she saw one featuring Porky the Pig, as she believed her school would surely be burned down if a representation of a pig—the meat of which is proscribed in Islam—was reported to be there (Woolley 2006). Not surprisingly, the tension created by the permanent state of high terror alert disrupts the development and functionality of these schools.

The cultivation of a free press constitutes another core component of social engineering which the U.S. has concentrated on in Iraq. However, development of an independent press in Iraq has yet to reach the standard achieved in the Philippines by 1935, and the United States could surely use a hand in disseminating the ideology it is expending so many resources to promote. Although the initial intentions were good, funding for independent media development in Iraq ultimately proved to be insufficient for the task. In 2004, USAID budgeted \$5 million out of its \$380 million budget for democracy and governance activities towards independent media development, but in 2006 USAID’s budget declined to a paltry \$130 million, and independent media development suffered drastic cuts as a result. CPA broadcasting remains stagnated, and consists primarily of “dull, dry official scripts making public

access TV look good” (Mann 2003). Naturally, many Iraqis tune out and turn instead to the only other alternatives—the incendiary and arguably anti-American broadcasts of Al Jazeera and Iranian television.

To counter the influence of anti-American media in the Middle East, the Pentagon has awarded three five-year contracts worth over \$300 million to private U.S.-based media relations companies with the aim of augmenting “psychological operations efforts” to help shape positive public opinion about the United States by running stories designed to bolster the American image. However, such a focus on non-indigenous, non-independent stations is not bound to be well accepted in the Arab world. Indeed, expending the effort to develop an independent media may be laborious and slow to yield immediate results conducive to the U.S. interests, “but the work spreads a valuable lesson: free speech matters, and when it works, it can change the entire political landscape” (O’Connor and Hoffman 2005). Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili recently remarked that the U.S. money invested in independent media development during the Cold War was “worth more than five thousand marines” to his fellow Georgians (O’Connor and Hoffman 2005). Recent examples of the political change wrought by the efforts of Radio Free Europe in the former Soviet Union serve as evidence that a true appreciation for democracy cannot be aroused by propaganda, but must instead be drawn from an appreciation for unadulterated truth. Rather than waste resources on PSYOPS³, which in the long run undermine the development of democratic institutions and trust for Americans, the U.S. would be best served by investing in independent media development and fostering the development of an enduring institution in Iraq, such as was achieved in the Philippines.

IV. CONCLUSION

It takes only a summary review of the current situation in Iraq to see that the occupation has been replete with pitfalls, and that much work remains before success in a nation-building endeavor is realized. However, President Jalal Talabani offers a heartening perspective to the contrary: “We should be pleased that it takes longer to form a government in the new Iraq than it did in the old Iraq. The old Iraq formed governments very quickly, in roughly the time needed for the tanks to travel from the barracks to the presidential palace” (Talabani 2005). Building a new political culture through incremented transitions and winning “hearts and minds” will effect lasting changes—not just begrudging acquiescence fashioned in the face of a gun barrel. When the most virile aspects of the insurgency are effaced and basic needs are met, a policy to achieve

3. PSYOPS (Psychological Operations) are efforts undertaken by a military that are geared towards influencing a target audience’s emotions, motives, and impression of a particular group or organization.

these goals may be devised through refined social engineering strategies. Building upon the lessons gleaned from the Philippines, we can suggest that included in these refinements ought to be recognition of the critical need to establish security, the importance of quick delegation of authority to local control, and the value of cultivating a sense of confidence and trust in the new government. The lasting success of schools and the free press in the Philippines serves as but further evidence that promoting the development of lasting democratic institutions—through democracy building programs, development of a vibrant free press, and construction of a new school system in Iraq—ought to be a priority when resources are allocated in the future.

Despite the multitude of setbacks that American policy has faced in Iraq since the 2003 invasion, our objectives are not yet out of reach. It has been the central aim of this paper to capitalize on the lessons of our nation-building experience in the Philippines by drawing from the pages of history a few timeless policies, predicated upon human nature, which retain their potential for relevant application today. Otto von Bismarck, a man renowned for his iron-fisted rule and effective military and social policies, once observed that “fools learn by experience, whereas wise men learn from other peoples’ experience.” As America prepares to invest additional resources and lives in the interest of a free and democratic Iraq, policymakers would be wise to both heed lessons of the past and employ policy drawn from chary forethought and consideration.

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SUSTAINABLE BANKING

Interview with Rachel Kyte

December of 2006

Jessica Durando, Amish Talwar, Saad Padela

Staff of WAR

Ever since they were set forth in 2002, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have taken the United Nations by storm. Hardly a speech is given on the premises without somehow referencing them. This list of 8 goals, 18 targets, and 48 technical indicators is, quite literally, the global agenda.

Millennium Development Goal #7, Target #9, reads: “Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources.” Five different indicators are given for this target—(1) proportion of land area covered by forest, (2) ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area, (3) energy use per \$1 GDP, (4) carbon dioxide emissions per capita, (5) proportion of population using solid fuels. An expert panel at the U.N. recommends that we start investing in the horse and buggy.

Most Americans harbor serious misconceptions about what sustainable developmentalists are actually saying. So do you, if you believed my white lie just a moment ago about the horse and buggy. In the West, we are accustomed to seeing sustainability phrased in terms of consumer sacrifice. Rarely do we see “green” solutions that are affordable, convenient, and pleasing to our sense of aesthetic.

In the developing world, things are different. A variety of barriers prevent businesses and their workers from adopt sustainable practices, even when they are more affordable, convenient, and aesthetically pleasing. Every time we knock down one of these barriers, sustainable development takes one step forward.

A promising avenue for sustainability reform in the developing world runs through the banking institutions. Most banks require their clients to meet certain financial and accounting standards. Increasingly, however, we have seen major banks display interest in other aspects of a firm’s operation – such as its safety standards and child labor regulations. In much the same way as the Nike scandal prompted many branded clothing manufacturers to send inspectors armed with safety and social regulation checklists to their suppliers, so we are seeing banks demand that their clients comply

with certain international standards. If these banks can be convinced to add environmental and social criteria to their compliance lists, then every mine, every factory, and every farm owner will be forced to adopt the standards for their firm. The implications for global sustainability reform are truly astounding.

The 15 billion kilowatt-hour question is: How can we convince banks to hop on to the sustainable development bandwagon? On what basis will we solicit their cooperation? A promising solution to this problem of engagement is offered by the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IFC argues that banks can be convinced on the basis of self-interest to enforce compliance with environmental criteria on their customers. By funding studies that show a strong relationship between meeting developmental standards and long-term firm profitability, and taking the results of these studies to bank managers, the IFC is turning many heads in the corporate boardroom.

World Affairs Review had an opportunity to speak with Dr. Rachel Kyte, Director of the Environment and Social Development Department of the IFC, after a presentation at the 59th Annual United Nations DPI/NGO conference held at U.N. Headquarters in New York, on September 6–8, 2006. We are delighted to present you with a full transcript of the email conversation, and we hope that you will find it both helpful and interesting.

— *Saad Padela*

- **People generally tend to associate sustainable development with international aid organizations, but here you have the IFC saying that we can use private sector resources to achieve the same goals as charity. How does this work? Why should the business world be interested in sustainable development?**

THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE on development tends to underestimate or even disregard the contribution of the private sector. And the voice of the private sector is seldom heard at international gatherings. However, in reality, private sector growth contributes more to economic development than international aid. In 2005, the flow of private capital into developing countries was at roughly \$350 billion, which is more than four times the amount of international aid. More and more development and aid organizations are looking now at an entrepreneurial approach to development.

To ensure that private sector growth takes place in a sustainable way, a number of instruments exist, starting with international environmental, labor and human rights law. But in addition to the coercion of legislation, we at IFC try to infuse to private companies the knowledge that a sustainable behavior is actually best for their bottom-line.

What does “sustainable development” mean for a private company? It is the ability to operate in the long-term. For that, a company requires a long-term vision and the ability to factor-in long term risks such as environmental degradation, social unrest, or customer boycotts. Why do more and more oil companies preach the merits of green energy? Why do coffee distributors invest in organic and fair trade coffee? Because behaving sustainably allows them to do better business and to do it longer.

- **The IFC claims that commercial banks should pay attention to environmental and social practices as indicators of long-term business performance. Companies that are able to meet development standards are better equipped to manage risk and tend to outperform companies that do not satisfy the requirements. Why is this the case?**

WE KNOW, through 50 years of investing in emerging markets, that companies that abide by strict environmental and social standards, like those that the IFC imposes to its clients, are less likely to encounter environmental problems or social unrest and are best equipped to tackle them when they encounter them.

Many studies have been done and are currently being done on the business case for sustainability. We ourselves conducted, in 2002, a study called “Developing Value” where we found strong evidence that companies do save money by

mitigating their environmental impact and treating their employees well. For example, treating employees well can generate financial returns by improving productivity. Or savings flow directly from using less energy and materials. Other benefits come from lower pollution costs, in the form of lower charges for waste handling and disposal fees.

More recently, we published a study called “The Promise of Private Equity” which shows, through five case studies of companies in which IFC took a stake, that businesses can meet the demands of the commercial marketplace and still be environmentally and socially responsible. That study shows how environmental and social factors were integrated in the core competencies of the companies and their management system and contributed directly to increased profits and better business performance.

We argue that the evidence is so strong that other financial institutions should also take it into account.”

■ **Does imposing environmental criteria make sense for all types of companies? How should development banks approach investment opportunities in extractive industries, such as mining? Is it a good idea to systematically exclude them on the basis of their non-sustainability?**

YOU ARE ASKING SEVERAL DIFFERENT QUESTIONS HERE. Yes, it makes sense for all companies to examine their environmental and social footprints. For that purpose, we have developed a set of standards that apply to all companies, but not all standards necessarily apply to all projects. We have rules about resettlement of population for example, which may not apply to all projects. But the framework is useful for all companies.

Yes, IFC invests in extractive industries and we do believe that there is a case for development banks to do so—albeit carefully—because extractive industries can be powerful development actors. Our Oil, Gas, Mining and Chemicals department found that together 59 companies in its portfolio in financial year 2006 created or sustained 50,000 direct jobs; contributed \$4.5 billion to government revenues; spent \$218 million on community development; and purchased about \$1.8 billion worth of goods and services from local suppliers.”

It would be unfair not to help developing countries tap into their fuel and mineral resources because it is complicated to operate such projects in a sustainable way. But what we can do is to pass on, via our financing, our environmental and social expertise to oil and mining companies. What we can do as well is to invest in sustainable energy projects in developing countries, a field where IFC is also active.

■ **Do you foresee any long-term trends in investment policy toward these industries? If so, what effect does this have on the future position of poorer countries with large mineral endowments?**

A NUMBER OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS—43 as of today—have signed on to the “Equator Principles”, which are environmental and social conditions based on IFC’s standards. Like the IFC, these institutions condition their financing of projects upon their clients’ implementation of these environmental and social standards.

The trend we observe is that the number of “Equator Banks” is growing rapidly, including more and more developing country institutions and other types of project financing institutions, such as export credit agencies. Recent data published by the Infrastructure Journal indicate that up to 93% of project financing in emerging markets—and that includes extractive industry projects—are being done in accordance with the Equator Principles. While not all of these deals are actually led by an Equator bank, the fact that one Equator bank is in a syndicate means that the entire syndicate is de facto bound by Equator.

So the trend among financiers is not to turn their back on extractive industries but rather to require of their clients environmental and social due diligence.”

■ **What is your organization doing to help banks realize that green-lending is in their best interests? What can be done to promote greater awareness?**

IN ADDITION TO having developed the standards upon which the Equator Principles are based, we actively promote these principles in both developed and emerging economies. In November, we promoted the Equator Principles in Brazil among financial institutions under the sponsorship of BOVESPA, the São Paulo Stock Exchange. We also have a series of conferences and workshops planned in locations such as China, India and Russia next year. We are also starting an outreach program that explores the benefit of Equator to asset managers and rating agencies. In addition, we provide support to financial institutions that wish to adopt the principles through information briefings and training.

■ **Environment and Social Development is a single department that covers two distinct issue areas. NGOs often accuse development banks of focusing exclusively on environmental standards and neglecting social issues. Development banks argue that it is difficult for them to come up**

with standards for an issue that itself lacks a broad consensus. What do you think is the major obstacle to progress in this area?

WE JUST FINISHED LAST YEAR revising our environmental and social standards. The review process lasted more than two years and we spent a lot of that time consulting with human rights and labor organizations. I think it is fair to say that we are now way ahead of all other financial institutions on the social side. The IFC standards include labor standards which refer directly to the International Labor Organization's core principles, including child labor and freedom of association. Our standards cover all human rights related to project operation, from the right to express an opinion—our standards require community engagement and include a grievance mechanism—to the right to security, both for workers and the surrounding community.

Of course, the proof is in the pudding, and we cannot claim victory until we have started assessing how successfully our new standards are being implemented. We committed, when our standards were adopted by the IFC board, to report for the first time on our new standards 18 months after the first day of implementation—that will be beginning of November 2007.

■ **Are there any other reasons for banks to adopt and adhere to these standards? Does participation enhance their reputation? What role, if any, does the general public play in shaping a bank's investment decisions?**

YES, CLEARLY, participating the Equator Principles does enhance a bank's reputation but the responsibilities that come with making such a commitment are such that I doubt any bank would ever sign up for reputational reasons only!

I would argue that the general public only plays an indirect role in shaping a bank's investment decisions. Very seldom do customers actually vote with their feet—for example looking up a bank's investment record in developing countries before taking up a loan with that bank. However, a number of non-governmental organizations are keeping a close watch on major banks—in fact their very *raison d'être* is to act as watchdogs to the financial community—and will launch campaigns against those banks whose behaviour they condemn.

■ **Would you say that sustainable investments are more of a global agenda item today than they were ten years ago? Are you getting enough attention from the public eye?**

JUDGING FROM THE NUMBER of invitations to conferences on sustainable investment we get, yes I do believe that the issue is now well positioned on the

global agenda and so is the IFC! But a lot of work still remains to be done, especially in emerging markets. We still need to make a lot more noise about the business case for adopting strong environmental and social standards.

Too many companies and financial institutions, especially those operating in developing countries, are content with short term profits. In certain rapidly developing countries the pressure to access natural resources is such that environmental and social considerations get ignored.

So we need to continue preaching the fact that sustainability is a small investment compared to the profits it yields and we need to continue educating investors and companies. We have created, with the Equator Banks, a community of like-minded institutions which are keen to spread that message. In addition, we are looking to partner with other business organizations that have a similar message.

Microfinance has certainly been getting a lot of attention recently. A few weeks ago, Professor Mohammad Yunus received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work in establishing Grameen Bank, now seen as one of the major leaders in microfinance initiatives. Does the fact that people are now paying attention to microfinance make your work any easier?

GIVEN ITS SIZE, IFC is actually more efficient when it comes to microfinance by providing support to microfinance institutions and encouraging commercial banks to develop lending services for small businesses, rather than by financing microfinance projects itself. At the end of financial year 2006, investments to support financing for micro, small, and medium businesses represented 60 percent of IFC's financial markets commitments. Microfinance commitments increased during the year to \$132 million. As of December 31, 2005, microfinance institutions supported by IFC had outstanding portfolios of about 2.5 million loans totaling \$4.1 billion. Our microfinance investments typically combine financing with technical assistance.

Many of Professor Yunus's clients are young Bangladeshi women and mothers. The IFC began a Gender Entrepreneurship Markets program earlier this year, and you have personally been a very strong supporter of investing in women. I was reading the other day that the first major loan under this program was a \$15 million agreement with Access Bank Plc to extend lines of credit exclusively to women entrepreneurs in Nigeria. What makes the financial empowerment of women such an important part of promoting development?

OUR GENDER ENTREPRENEURSHIP MARKETS is actually two years old this month! We noticed a while ago that women business owners have traditionally had problems getting access to business loans for many reasons. However, the benefits of extending banking services to women entrepreneurs are significant. World Bank Group research, for example, has established that women are more likely than men to contribute additional income to household poverty reduction, that giving more women access to credit and increasing their economic power is more likely to translate into improved livelihoods for a wide cross-section of society, and that women entrepreneurs are more likely to employ other women.

We are telling banks that they can grow their business considerably by serving the “underbanked” and “unbanked”. The underserved women’s market in access to finance is now becoming a bigger focus of banking executives around the world. And while the spotlight is currently on the role microfinance has played in lifting poor women out of poverty, women’s access to small and medium enterprises financing is also gaining increasing attention.

TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:
AN UPHILL BATTLE?

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INTRODUCTION

Turkey, historically nicknamed the “sick man of Europe,” has in recent years attempted to reconnect with its western neighbors by petitioning for membership in the elite European Union (E.U.). The E.U., currently composed of twenty-five European democracies, is undeniably an economic and political powerhouse, and is expanding its legislation to include political and military agreements. In 2004, the E.U.’s latest expansion brought in ten Eastern European countries, formerly trapped behind the “Iron Curtain,” showing the world that the E.U. is willing to work with, and make accommodations for, struggling economies and states. The E.U. is also on schedule for yet another expansion in 2007, when it will welcome Romania and Bulgaria. While on its website the Union describes itself as a “family of democratic European countries,” the E.U.’s definition of what it truly is to be ‘European’ remains unclear.

DEEPLY-ROOTED: EUROPEAN HISTORICAL IDENTITY

Europe has no real, distinct geographic boundaries; in fact, some geographers do not even consider Europe to be a continent, but a peninsula of Asia. If this is the case, Turkey, a large part of Asia Minor, could well be considered part of the European ‘peninsula.’ However, geographic proximity may not be enough to give a state the right to call itself European.

Up until the 19th century European states were collectively referred to as “Christendom,” and while that designation may no longer apply, the idea that a Christian identity unites Europe persists through today. During the Crusades around the beginning of the second millennium A.D., the Christian armies of Europe invaded the Near East, capturing several Muslim capitals before being eventually repelled. In 1453, Constantinople was captured by the Muslims, a fact that remains a sore spot in Christian European history. Aside from that, Ottoman Turks once even reached as far into the European continent as Vienna, often considered the gateway to Central Europe. Whether this turbulent history between Turkey and Europe and the present political situation will prevent the accession of the modern Turkish state into the E.U. is under serious debate. And though similar reasons should possibly have hindered the admittance of several Eastern European nations into the E.U., this has not been the case. Whether cultural, political, economic, or religious, there is clearly a barrier preventing Turkey from being admitted as quickly as the European nations of the former Soviet Bloc.

The idea of a United Europe began with the Duke of Sully’s ‘Very Christian Council of Europe’ in the 1600s. The notion then resurfaced during the

World Wars to prevent more continental warfare, particularly between France and Germany. After World War II, men like Winston Churchill championed the idea of a “United States of Europe,” leading to the establishment of a coal and steel community between the two countries. From Victor Hugo to Churchill to the E.U. today, the aim has been to bring the traditions and civilizations of the continent into the next century peacefully, and to celebrate the continent’s shared history. The question is, can Turkey be included in this European ideal? And if not, on what grounds will Turkey be denied this right? As we have already begun to see, the main issue is not whether Turkey sees itself as European, but whether those countries already holding membership will allow it that designation.

THE LONG ORDEAL: A HISTORY OF TURKEY’S PETITION FOR MEMBERSHIP

Turkey has long aspired to become a member of the European Union. The process for Turkish accession began in 1959 when Turkey applied for associate membership, allowing it to enjoy closer economic and trading relations with the E.U. By entering into an association agreement, a country agrees to make political and economic reforms within itself in exchange for tariff free trade with the E.U. Once Turkey became an associate member, presumably it would have been on track to full and integrated membership. In 1963, the Ankara association agreement was signed in the state’s capital and Turkey became an Associate Member (Arikan 2003, 1). A military coup froze negotiations in 1980, a bad omen since the main goal of the European Union is peace and stability between members. In 1987, Turkey applied for formal membership; however, more than political instability would deny this move. Turkey’s ongoing conflict with Greek Cypriots and their Greek supporters over the recognition of the Turkish-occupied northern section of Cyprus remained a hot issue. Moreover, Turkey’s struggling, inflated economic situation made the E.U. decide against the approval of Turkish membership. In order to help Turkey’s economy, which would allow it to move forward with membership proceedings, the E.U. formed a customs union with the aspiring candidate in 1995. According to the Treaty of the E.U., each of its member states, as well as the European Parliament, must agree before an enlargement may take place. Finally, in the Helsinki European Council of 1999, the E.U. recognized Turkey as a candidate on equal footing with other potential members, such as Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Cyprus, members who have since been admitted, leaving Turkey behind.

THE ROAD TO ACCESSION: TURKISH REFORMS

Recent domestic developments in Turkey have shown that there is support

within the country for the government's pursuit of E.U. membership. The election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, a pro-European Turkish party, led to a number of reforms in the Turkish government. These reforms, notably in the areas of civic participation, human rights, and the economy, led to increased political and economic stability. After a devastating thirty years of hyperinflation, the government was able to reduce the inflation rate to 6% from levels as high as 75% during the 1990s. The efforts of the Turkish government, however, will not be enough if certain conflicts remain unresolved.

A major obstacle facing Turkish membership in the E.U. is the situation in Cyprus, where Turkish immigrants backed by the Turkish government in Ankara have, in the eyes of the Greek Cypriot majority, invaded and occupied the northern third of the island. In 2004, Turkey announced its support of Kofi Annan's U.N.-backed plan, which called for federal unification of the entire island, merging the two feuding sections into one united republic; however, the terms of unification were notably weak. While making concessions for some autonomy on both sides, the agreement did not lay out a specific framework for true reunification of the island. Turkish Cypriots of the internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus readily accepted the plan, but Greek Cypriots rejected it.

Beyond its efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue, the government worked on improving its record in other areas—the European Union is, after all, quite demanding of its members' human rights laws. "The Union recalls that membership requires that a candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities... (Burrell 2005, 1)" Turkey abolished the death penalty, instituted a crackdown on torture, and granted more legal rights for the minority Kurdish population.

Impressed with the strong effort put forth by Turkey, the E.U.'s leaders agreed on the 16th of December 2004 to start accession negotiations. Despite a vigorous attempt by the unsympathetic Austrian government (which is notoriously xenophobic, particularly in regards to Turks) to offer Turkey less than full membership, E.U. membership negotiations were officially launched. The lengthy process was concluded in June 2006.

UNFRIENDLY NEIGHBORS: EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION

While the European Parliament has indicated that it favors Turkish membership, and has begun the process for Turkish accession into the E.U., public opinion within most European countries seems to be that Turkey should not be allowed in. Though both Turkish and European governments

claim to be 'secular', the difference in values between a predominantly Muslim country and the historically Christian E.U. member states may seem, to some, an insurmountable obstacle.

The opinion on Turkish accession to the E.U. varies among European countries, and also between governments and people. In Germany, where there is a significant Turkish population, "opinion polls say up to three-quarters of the population oppose Turkish membership" (Repa, 2005). Furthermore, Angela Merkel, the CDU chancellor, has asked other E.U. leaders not to "encourage" Turkey Citizenship laws in Germany, which are based on blood, exclude Turkish migrants and their children (even those born in the country) from attaining citizenship; thus, instead of being a voice of support for their homeland, they are kept silent and separate from the German population. "Of the two largest political parties [in Germany], the Social Democrats [SPD] say they want a 'modern Turkey in the E.U.'; [whereas] the Christian Democrats [CDU] oppose membership, proposing instead a 'privileged partnership'" (Repa, 2005).

To the west of Germany lies France, which has the largest Muslim population in the Union, as well as a large Armenian population. While the government of France officially backs Turkey's bid, the prime minister says that Turkey must first recognize the Greek Cypriot government of Cyprus; interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy, who harshly reacted to the riots of mostly Muslim youth in Fall 2005 by threatening their deportation, does not support Turkey either. It should be noted that Sarkozy is now a presidential candidate for the next French elections. Additionally, only 20% of French citizens polled said they supported Turkey's bid. Opinion polls in Austria, one of the most conservative countries in the Union, "show [that] 75% of 15–24 year-olds [are] opposed to Turkish membership; rising to 82% among people over 55" (Repa 2005), giving the German-influenced country the strongest public disapproval of Turkey's membership in the Union.

Recent events have also taken a toll on European-Muslim relations. Most notably, high profile terror attacks in the United States and Europe, as well as the riots in France in 2005, have all contributed to the rise of anathema.

The strongest supporters of Turkey now appear to be Poland, Spain, Italy, and surprisingly, Great Britain. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw believes that if Turkey were to be included in the E.U., it would become "a beacon of democracy and modernity". He also believes that, as a Muslim country, Turkey would serve as "a shining example across the whole of its neighbouring region" (Repa 2005). This is especially critical to a country such as Great Britain, who supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Great Britain, of course, would like to show the rest of the world that it is not anti-Muslim; rather, it supports Turkish entry into the E.U. more than other European states that opposed the

invasion of Iraq. Unfortunately, this may be of no consequence, as Turkey is not the most popular state among its Arab-Muslim neighbors. While they appear to be increasingly supportive of Islamist (political Islam) regimes, Turkey is still holding firm to secularism, even with its new Islamist-led government.

“According to the recent survey conducted by the TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Research Foundation), the majority of the Turkish public... believe there is increased religiosity that manifests itself in increased number of mosque attendants. Nevertheless, the public does not view piety as contradictory to their Western way of life and democratic values. On the contrary, they view the freedom of expression and practice of Islam as consolidation of democracy in Turkey in its true essence.”
(Kalyoncu 2006)

In this sense, the Turkish public appears to be more progressive than most of Europe believes.

POSSIBLE ROADBLOCKS: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS POPULATION

Beyond public opinion of Turkey’s bid, there are also broad economic and political concerns. If Turkey joins the E.U., it will be the largest country in the Union in size, and second largest in population. This could change the slant of Europe’s politics dramatically. A sizable population of a different culture and mindset might vote very differently on European referendums than would their Christian neighbors. The E.U. member with the largest population at present is Germany, with 82,422,299 people, but with a population growth rate of -0.02%. Turkey’s population is estimated to be 70,413,958—already about 10 million more than the Union’s third largest country, France—with a population growth rate of 1.06% (CIA World Factbook). With the population of Europe continually declining due to falling birth rates and emigration, and the populations of Muslim Middle Eastern states, including Turkey, continually rising with very high birth rates, Turkey could easily grow larger than Germany in the near future. With a large population and an agrarian economy, Turkey will be at the top of the E.U.’s “to do” list for years to come, if and when it becomes a member.

E.U. PROGRAMS FOR UNDERDEVELOPED MEMBERS

When the E.U. enlarged in 2004 with the addition of ten Eastern European states, much of the supranational government’s funding was redirected into the eastern region. E.U. legislation stipulates that its members need to be above a

minimum economic level; it cannot function if one half of its membership is in poverty and one half is prosperous, as this may only drag down the entire economy of the E.U. The Union tries to strike a balance and raise the economic levels of the poorer countries by aiding industrialization and infrastructure and by creating “social cohesion among the member states through the Structural and Cohesion Funds and the Common Agricultural Policy” (Arikan 2003, 11). Not all original members were pleased with the E.U. expansion because, although the expansion brings in new markets for Western European goods, it diverts funding from existing members’ own populations and domestic needs. Turkey will need a considerable amount of E.U. funding and aid to help its economy match those of other European member states.

Turkey would be joining after the bloc of Eastern states, which themselves have large agricultural sectors, low income, and low levels of economic development. Turkey’s GDP per capita is “less than 75 per cent of the community average, which means that the whole of Turkey would qualify for assistance from the European Regional Development Fund” (Arikan 2003, 13). Additionally, Turkey’s unemployment levels and “low levels of worker skills” (Arikan 2003, 13) would warrant assistance from the European Social Fund and the Guidance Fund. “Turkey’s GDP in 2003 was EUR 212 billion, which is about 2 per cent of the GDP of EU-25 [the current 25 members of the E.U.]. Total public debt relative to GDP increased from 33 per cent in 1983 to 61 per cent in 2002” (Burrell 2005, 4). All of these factors combined create the fear in current member governments that all the funding their countries provide to the E.U. will be put into fixing Turkey’s problems, and that this would not please their conservative electorates. If one considers the Irish example, it is clear that the E.U. has the ability to restructure a country’s economy. Quite poor before membership, Ireland has now opened up to foreign investments, particularly medical and computer technology companies, bringing jobs and capital into the country. Ireland is often cited as the E.U.’s greatest success story. If the E.U. is willing to work with Turkey in the same way, it could possibly do just as well; the question is whether or not it is, in fact, willing to do so.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

With the recent wave of conservatives winning national elections in Europe, it is even less likely that their respective electorates would be willing to send aid to a poor Muslim state. “The inward-looking climate throughout the continent is playing into the hands of right-wing political parties that until recently had been stigmatized as unacceptable in proper European society. The radical populist right is scoring electoral successes from Poland to Austria, from Switzerland to Germany” (Poggioli 2006). Romania and Bulgaria, two

conservative Eastern states, joined early in 2007, adding their voices to the debate. “The new slogans being heard throughout Europe—even from social democrats—are: tighter rules on welfare benefits for immigrants; expulsion of illegal immigrants; strict limits on new immigration and family reunifications; and specific requirements to obtain residency and citizenship” (Poggioli 2006). One possible cause of this conservative reversal in ideology may be globalization, which the E.U. has long fought against. American imports, which flooded European markets after WWII, have threatened European internal infrastructure for a long time. With the advent of the E.U., Europe chose to look inward and gave special trading preference to other members. International law, however, prevents this from being too over-arching, and globalization continues to have an impact on European economies. Add to this an ever-increasing “white flight” from Europe to countries such as Canada, the United States, and Australia, and a quickly expanding immigrant population, and it is no surprise that ethnic Europeans are becoming increasingly xenophobic. In Britain alone, “the latest figures show that a record 207,000 British citizens left the country in 2004” (Casciani 2005).

The Netherlands, known for its accepting and tolerant attitude, has been having serious issues with its Muslim populations. The country has recently become the focus of Muslim outrage over its cartoons depicting the Muslim prophet Muhammad. In Islam, believers are not supposed to create representational art depicting any animals or people, let alone the Prophet himself. Problems such as this will provide more fuel for the nationalist Turkish movement, which does not wish to see Turkey join the E.U. The murder of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh by a Muslim extremist following the release of his film on violence against women in Islamic Society certainly has contributed to the anti-Muslim feelings in the Netherlands. “In the weeks following the murder, over twenty religious elementary schools, mosques, and churches were burned down in Holland [the Netherlands] by self-appointed Christian crusaders and Islamic jihadists” (Klausen 2005, 4).

The Dutch case serves as just one example of the kinds of unanticipated anti-Muslim feelings rising in European populations—Islamophobia is gripping the entire continent. A British think tank, the Runnymede Trust, published a report in 1997 on the phenomenon entitled *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*.

“[The report] concluded that anti-Islamic bias prevailed in public discussions of Islam and the problems of Muslims, and argued that this bias fostered discrimination in employment and schooling, hate crimes, mischaracterization in the media and in everyday life, and a range of other problems experienced by Muslims which derive from these four sources.” (Klausen 2005, 57)

What is clear from the rise of xenophobia in Europe is that even if Turkey completes the same membership process as every other potential E.U. member, Europeans are not ready to accept them as willingly. “There is a clash of values, but perhaps the most important is that between two old European parties, secularists and conservatives, as each struggles to come to terms with religious pluralism” (Klausen 2005, 3).

SECURITY

Internal security, which appears to be under increasing threat in Europe, proves to be a major concern for the Europeans. September 11, 2001, shocked the Western world, over though Europe itself is no stranger to religiously-inspired conflict. The situation worsened in the summer of 2005 when the London transport system was attacked—crowded buses and busy subway stations were bombed by Muslim fundamentalists. Then, in the fall of that same year, 2005, France was rocked by demonstrations against the government in which hundreds of cars were burned nightly by protesters in the poorer districts of its urban centers. Although only one person was injured, and the incidents went no farther than burning cars, the images released by the media at the time gave the international public an impression that the whole of France was burning (Bigg 2005). Economic desperation essentially served as the major basis for these riots (there is an increasing unemployment rate in France, especially among youth and immigrants), but the incidents were seen by the media as a religious/cultural conflict and were tied almost exclusively to France’s Muslim population. Mostly belonging to the lower-classes, France’s Muslim immigrant population lives in ghetto-like conditions in the country’s urban areas, and suffers from high unemployment rates; nevertheless, with the increasing tide of conservatism sweeping Europe, the riots were portrayed and viewed only as a religious and cultural uprising against Europe. Rather than being sympathetic to the plight of France’s vulnerable immigrant population, European public opinion turned against them. The French interior minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, threatened, “If you want to live in France with a residency permit you have to abide by the laws... Immigration laws allow expulsions. I am the interior minister and I will apply the law” (Bigg 2005). In a poll released by the Profession Politique, “48 percent of respondents believe the interior minister was as tough as required in dealing with the situation. Conversely, 23 per cent of respondents believe Sarkozy was too tough, while 25 per cent expected him to be tougher” (Angus Reid Global Monitor 2005).

It appears that Europe is not as liberal and welcoming as it was once popularly considered to be. Moreover, by using the Muslim populations in Europe as issues instead of voters, European politicians are losing potential

sources of political support. “It is also the case that many Turkish-origin residents in Europe are not value-conservatives and Turkish-origin Muslims often hold strongly anticlerical views” (Klausen 2005, 91), once again echoing the notion that Turks may very well be able to fit into the European political landscape with ease.

Then, in 2006, law enforcement officials in Britain uncovered a plot to blow up several U.S.-bound passenger airlines over the Atlantic. The Muslim extremists responsible for the plot were caught, but not before a renewed wave of fear spread throughout the Western world. Immigrants were not the only ones taking part in these attacks; naturalized citizens were also involved. In a public speech from November 2006, a few months after the airliner plot was uncovered, British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that the suspects in the London Transport bombings of 2005 apparently “were converted from what appeared to be ordinary lives—in a matter of weeks and months, not years to a position where some were allegedly prepared to commit suicide and murder thousands of people” (Morgan 2006). The paranoia stemming from the idea that one’s neighbor could be a potential suicide bomber was no longer solely an American issue.

While the extremists that participated in these attacks were not Turkish, the fact that they were Muslim has certainly had a political effect on Turkey. The Arab-Muslim countries of Syria and Lebanon lie close to Turkey, a fact which makes many Europeans uneasy. In the past year, Lebanon has increasingly served as the focus of news reports because of the fact that the southern part of the country is the base for the group Hezbollah, which captured two Israeli soldiers in July 2006, renewing the ongoing conflict with Israel to the south. Though Turkey is itself a strong ally of Israel and has adopted a decidedly negative stance towards Syria, not all Europeans are able to separate one Muslim country from another, even though “at the moment, most of Turkey’s eastern borders are formally closed” (Burrell 2005, 221). The growing fear of a nuclear Iran has also not been quelled—“a poll by the Pew Foundation in June found that 53 percent of Turks have positive views of Iran, while public opinion of Europe and the United States has slipped sharply” (Tavernise 2006).

Part of the fear of the proximity of Turkey to the countries of the Middle East and North Africa stems from the fact that, once in the E.U., a citizen can travel and work in any other E.U. state. Moreover, a traveler can pass through most E.U. nations without ever showing identification or a passport, a result of the Schengen Agreement, which was signed in 1985 and is currently being implemented in 26 countries. These laws, while improving the flow of goods and workers throughout the continent, make it harder for officials to keep track of citizens and visitors.

In order to secure the internal market, future external borders will have to

be impermeable to smuggling and to goods that do not meet E.U. standards. In addition, borders need to be equipped with veterinary and plant border inspection points in compliance with E.U. legislation. There is currently a high risk of penetration of animal diseases due to the uncontrolled entry of animals across the eastern and south-eastern borders, and to the weak internal control of movements of live animals and animal products (Burrell 2005, 221).

The issue that will be the most important for the public at large, however, will not be smuggled goods, but illegal aliens. With a large Muslim minority in Europe, it would not be hard to get from Turkey to Western Europe, and to do so largely undetected. The fear of another major attack on European soil prevents many Europeans and their elected officials from willingly supporting Turkey's membership bid. While Turkey has done more than any other potential E.U. candidate to integrate with the Common European Security and Defence policy (CESD), the fear is that the addition of more members, particularly those without what is considered a 'traditional European heritage', will "make it more difficult to reach a common position on a number of policy issues relating to the CESD" (Arikan 2003, 15).

In further regards to security, it has long been the opinion of Europe, especially since the devastation of the two World Wars, that friendly neighbors provide the best security. Having stable, democratic neighbors with strong economic ties to Europe is considered the best way to protect the continent and to procure allies. Turkey's accession to the E.U. "has the potential for increasing security and political stability in the south-eastern corner of the Union by incorporating a strong, committed member state on its south-eastern frontier" (Burrell 2005, 281). The modern regional conflicts that began after the break up of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc were seen as a grave security threat to Western Europe; however, now that much of Eastern Europe has joined the Union, with more from that region on their way to full membership (or at the very least, associate membership), Europe's new concerns lie in the regions adjoining the south and the east, namely the Mediterranean, North Africa, and Central Asia. The challenge now facing the E.U. is deciding whether or not to push these countries away and fortify their existing borders, or to try and foster in these countries a desire to modernize in the Western sense, become democratic, and integrate into the European model. As the enlargement of the E.U. in 2004 brought in many Eastern nations requiring much funding and assistance in order to assimilate, it appears that the E.U. is willing to take on the challenge of integrating non-Western states. "[As] a long-term aim, a strong, stable E.U. member to the southeast, acting as a bridge for trade and political dialogue with the Middle East and Asia, must be considered an opportunity for the E.U." (Burrell 2005, 281).

The E.U. seems to think that integration, and not exclusion, will prove to

be the best way to secure Europe. The question remains how far, geographically and financially, the E.U. is willing and able to stretch.

THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS AND ITS EVOLUTION

Another obstacle facing Turkish membership is the enlargement process, which, as compared with those of the past, seems to have changed and become more demanding of the candidates rather than of the Union itself. Whereas before, the approach may have been something along the lines of, “let the applicant join the E.U. and then address its political and human rights issues,” now it seems that “all applicant countries must make sufficient progress to move their political and human rights systems in the direction of the E.U. system before they join the E.U.. This is to ensure that their internal political conditions do not pose any serious problems, not only for the existing political system of the E.U., but also for its future objective of creating a common European system of political values” (Arikan 2003, 23).

Despite being a predominantly Muslim country, Turkey has a secular government, and since Atatürk’s revolutionary changes after World War I, it has become increasingly European, or at the very least aspires to be. The Arabic script, which was used until the 1920s to write Turkish, has since been replaced with the Latin one; Sharia, the Islamic law code, has been replaced with a secular civil code. Turkey has since been pro-West and nationalistic, even after the decline of nationalist movements in the Middle East, as well as the decline of pan-Arabism after the 1967 War between Egypt and Israel. These reforms and differences in government policy have divided Turkey from its Muslim-Arab neighbors for decades (Shadid 2002, 145). Despite the separation that exists between the traditional Islamic world and Turkey, there remains strong skepticism about whether or not Turkey is really “European.” For Turkey, the way to refute the contention that it is not ‘European’, and to validate all of the policies and programs it has worked on to modernize, is to gain membership into the European Union. Unfortunately for these reform-minded politicians, their pro-West forces in the Turkish government have recently been increasingly under fire from the anti-West Turkish nationalist parties. The E.U.’s slow treatment of Turkey’s bid, and its seeming reluctance to assist Turkey (despite its willingness to give aid to Eastern Europe in their bids), gives strength to the anti-West movement in Turkey (Arikan 2003, 26).

Adding fuel to the fire are the conservative views of the next Eastern E.U. members. Edmund Stoiber, the premier of Bavaria, and an ally of Angela Merkel of Germany, stated that “Turkey is not European and does not belong in Europe,” soon after the uproar over Pope Benedict XVI’s controversial remarks about Islam (Durmazpan 2006). This gave rise to the belief among

many Turkish citizens that the E.U.'s membership criteria now included "Christian values" (Durmazpan 2006). Binnaz Toprak, a professor of political science at Bosphorus University, described Turkish sentiment by saying, "There are two Turkeys within Turkey right now" (Tavernise 2006). Moreover, Turks seem confused as to why the Greek-Cypriot government of Cyprus would be included in the E.U. before Turkey, as well as with the E.U.'s refusal to recognize the rights of Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish northern section of Cyprus. Added to all of these factors is the E.U.'s changing criteria for membership, as the earlier Mediterranean enlargement, which included Greece, had less challenging stipulations. In the current negotiations, "the E.U. has insisted on Turkey's prior convergence towards European standards to ensure that the risks associated with eventual membership are reduced to manageable levels" (Ugur 1999). In addition, a recent European Commission report has warned that, in the future, a candidate's political reforms will be more closely scrutinized by the E.U. for potential members in the next enlargement, but future enlargements will also not be as wide in scope as the 2004 enlargement, which included ten new countries (BBC News 2006).

MORE ROADBLOCKS: TURKISH HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL ISSUES

Despite the fact that some European countries have come out in favor of Turkey's membership bid, and that the Pope has given his blessing to Turkey's entrance to the E.U., one of the strongest points that conservative, anti-Turkish European states can still cling to is that of Turkey's human rights record. There are several key human rights issues (or violations, as many see them) that Turkey has yet to rectify. The treatment of Kurds, the non-recognition of the Armenian Genocide, certain freedom of speech issues, and other civil rights have all been brought up as reasons to delay membership proceedings. The group Human Rights Watch has recently petitioned the Turkish government because, according to the group, "Turkey is one of only two member states of the Council of Europe that provide no alternative service [to those who do not wish to serve in the military]" (Cartner 2006).

Compulsory military service is not the only issue at hand here; it also cuts into freedom of speech. "Not only does Turkey refuse to recognize the right of conscientious objection, it also restricts the right to freely discuss the issue. Article 318 of the Turkish Criminal Code provides for imprisonment for up to three years for making public statements that undermine the institution of military service" (Human Rights Watch). According to Human Rights Watch, "numerous" individuals have already been charged with violation of this law.

Nevertheless, for Turkey to be classified as a democracy, the political role of the military has to cease. The problem is that most Turks believe that

Turkey must maintain a strong military to keep control of problematic areas. This in turn reflects the argument that Turkey has not yet achieved the degree of social and political stability required for membership in the E.U. (Muftuler-Bac 1997, 75).

Despite the black mark this puts on Turkey's image, there have been efforts to reform this law within the government, including a move to amend the law so that not fulfilling one's military obligations to the state is no longer grounds for stripping one of Turkish citizenship (Human Rights Watch).

The Turkish government, in response to increased pressure from the European Parliament, made reforms in other areas as well. A special Parliamentary Commission was set up to investigate the conditions in Turkey's prisons and detention centers. "This Parliamentary Commission issued a report at the end of 1985 which contained a number of recommendations aimed at preventing abuses... as a result of these parliamentary investigations, a number of police officers were found guilty of using torture as a tool of investigation, and were prosecuted and punished" (Muftuler-Bac 1997, 87).

A recent report from the European Commission has also raised concerns over whether Turkey has made the necessary effort to improve its human rights record and laws. The report states that "Ankara [the Turkish capital] must ensure freedom of expression 'without delay' by repealing or amending Article 301 of the [Turkish] penal code, which has led to the prosecution of numerous writers for 'insulting Turkishness'" (BBC News 2006). The pressure the E.U. is putting on Turkey seems to be creating disillusionment among the Turkish population rather than encouraging them to put pressure on the government to quickly institute the necessary reforms. Recent polls in Turkey have shown popular support for E.U. membership at only 30%. Despite this, the Turkish government remains optimistic about the country's future in the E.U.—"Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said his country was committed to E.U. membership and remained 'determined to meet all criteria set by the E.U.'" (BBC News 2006). Additionally, "because of its limited anchoring ability, the E.U. has insisted on Turkey's prior convergence towards European standards to ensure that the risks associated with eventual membership are reduced to manageable levels" (Ugur 1999).

THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

The situation in Cyprus, one that must be resolved if Turkey is to be welcomed into the E.U., is not a new development. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI, Britain annexed the island, where both Greeks and Turks lived. Later, the Cypriots achieved independence from the

British, and established a government that included the Greek and Turkish citizens. Then in 1974, the Greek military regime instigated a military coup d'état in Cyprus, leading to the ousting of the Cypriot government and the establishment of a dictatorship interested in uniting the island with Greece. As a response, Turkey invaded under the pretext of protecting Turkish Cypriots. After many UN resolutions and negotiations, the issue has still not been resolved. Turkish citizens occupy the northern third of the island, and, along with Turkey, have declared it to be the sovereign Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkey is the only nation to recognize the Northern Cyprus republic. The world's other states, as well as the United Nations, recognize only the Greek-Cypriot government as having sovereignty over the entire island. A visitor can enter Northern Cyprus from the south, but cannot enter Southern Cyprus from the north. Turkey has banned Greek-Cypriot shipping and airplanes from all air and sea ports in Northern Cyprus as well as in Turkey. The Greek-Cypriot government, for its part, has put an embargo on Turkish Northern Cyprus. Essentially, Northern Cyprus is completely dependent on its survival from Turkey. The Greek-Cypriot government and the Greek-Cypriot citizens see the Turkish inhabitants as illegal invaders (McDonald 2001, 117–122).

The strained relationship between Turkey and Cyprus could indefinitely slow the course of Turkey's membership proceedings. "The European Commission has given Turkey until mid-December to open its ports to Cypriot ships, or face unspecified consequences" (BBC News 2006). Though Turkey promised to "extend" its customs union with the E.U. to Cyprus, opening its ports and airports to Cypriot shipping, it has not yet done so. It is believed that if Turkey does not follow through with the E.U.'s demands, accession negotiations will be frozen for an unknown period of time.

The situation in Cyprus continues to be one of the biggest obstacles to Turkey's E.U. membership. "Cyprus has threatened to block further negotiations if Turkey refuses to open its ports to Cypriot ships as it does for traffic from other E.U. countries. For its part, Turkey is pushing for an end to the direct trade embargo on the Turkish part of Cyprus, a move which Cyprus opposes" (Riebert 2006). For Turkey to gain membership into the Union, it will need as much European support as possible, particularly from its historic enemies, such as Greece. Greece, in a surprising move, was the first E.U. country that supported Turkey's bid, perhaps out of the hope that the requirements of membership would help change Turkish policy with regards to the situation in Cyprus and with the disputes the country has with Greece over territoriality in the Aegean Sea. As Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul has said, all sides must "take a step forward" to resolve the dispute over Cyprus (BBC News 2006).

While there is high emotion on both sides of the Cyprus debate, it is not the only problem facing Turkey. Another critical issue concerning Turkey's human rights record is the country's continued non-recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Though feuding over an event that took place almost a century ago is hard to fathom for some politicians, it is a matter of historical memory—the collective memory of a group that may reach back in time over dozens of generations. In the final years leading up to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish government was ruled by an organization known as the Young Turks. This secular group was committed to the reform of the Sultan's rule over the Empire. With a coalition of various other reform groups, the Young Turks instituted a political coup in 1908, and established a constitution that transformed them overnight from an illegal and suppressed organization to the primary power-wielding authority. In 1913, radical nationalist elements of the Young Turks instigated their own coup d'état, leading to the emergence of a dictatorial Triumvirate that would rule until the defeat of the Empire in World War I. The Young Turks are thought to be responsible for the Armenian Genocide that occurred between 1915 and 1917, although the policies of the Ottoman government during this period are not recognized as 'genocide' in Turkey today. The Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire prior to the Genocide numbered around two million, and was a protected millet, or community. Following the outbreak of World War I, the government enacted several laws that were targeted at the Armenian community, which whom it viewed as being collectively disloyal and rebellious. The first of these laws began the forced deportation of Armenians from the Empire; the next stated that the government could seize any and all land, animals, and homes belonging to Armenians. These laws were followed by secret arrests, forced deportations and marches, and finally, confinement to concentration camps. It is estimated that over one million Armenians died or were murdered during this period.

Most Western scholars recognize the events of this period as genocidal in nature, and a number of Turkish intellectuals support this view. However, there is some dispute over whether the deaths of Armenians during this time were the result of a direct and deliberate government-led genocide, or whether they were caused by inter-communal fighting including both Christians and Muslims. In Turkey, where the constitution includes the controversial Article 301 (the law against insulting 'Turkishness'), referring to the event as Genocide is especially taboo. A high school curriculum change in Turkey instructed teachers to explain the controversy to their students as unfounded allegations. The E.U. has not officially made the recognition of the Armenian Genocide as a deliberate government-orchestrated operation a stringent condition for Turkey's entry

into the Union; however, with more than half of E.U. countries recognizing the Armenian Genocide, should these countries decide to refuse to support Turkey on these grounds, Turkish accession negotiations could certainly be slowed. E.U. members could either choose this course of action, or simply use the non-recognition of Armenian Genocide as their public reason for not supporting Turkey, while privately harboring other reasons. France has even made it illegal to deny the Armenian Genocide, though Turks may say that this is evidence of the French government caving into the interests of their country's large Armenian Diaspora community.

In 2005, a conference of intellectuals on the Armenian Genocide was scheduled in Turkey, but was cancelled for a second time, a mere ten days before accession talks were set to begin with the E.U. (BBC News 2005). Despite the fact that it was a Turkish court that ruled that the conference must be cancelled, not all Turks were in favor of this course of action. “[Prime Minister] Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that although you may not approve of a point of view, that does not mean you should prevent others from expressing it” (BBC News 2005).

TURKEY'S KURDISH POPULATION

Perhaps the best known human rights violation in Turkey is that concerning the Kurdish population. The conflict between the Turkish government, ever concerned with Turkish nationalism, and the Kurdish minority that seeks to gain a certain degree of autonomy, is one that Turkey would like to deal with internally. However, the E.U. is not willing to let Turkey handle the situation on its own, since internal efforts to resolve the conflict have usually ended with violence.

The major stumbling block between Turkey and the E.U. during the 1990s has been the Kurdish problem and the granting of cultural rights to the Kurdish people. Thus, the E.U. has been influential in making the Turkish government realize that Turkey's future within the European order is greatly determined by maintaining democratic practices for all, and that there is therefore a necessity to find a political solution to the Kurdish problem, not only a military solution, because the problem goes much deeper. (Muftuler-Bac 1997, 91).

However, to gain a more complete understanding of the Kurdish situation, one must understand that, in Turkey, “one-fifth of the population is of Kurdish origin. The Kurds were integrated into the Turkish political system as long as they saw themselves as Turks: the Turkish Republic did not recognize a separate Kurdish identity” (Muftuler-Bac 1997, 89). In order to make their interests known to the world, a band of Kurdish separatists formed the

PKK, the Kurdistan Worker's Party, transforming Kurdish nationalism from a solely political issue into a military issue as well. Of course, Kurds didn't choose formal 'army against army' battle, but rather guerilla warfare. Since the 1980s, there have been many PKK-related outbreaks of violence not only in southeastern rural Turkey, where much of the Turkish Kurdish population is located, but also in large cities, such as Istanbul. The Turkish government sees the PKK as an illegal terrorist group. "The PKK is not seen as representative of the Kurdish people in Turkey, but its activities are hampering any move towards a democratic solution and integration between the two communities" (Muftuler-Bac 1997, 89). The E.U. has, in an effort to quell any ongoing domestic conflicts within Turkey and thus prepare it for entrance into the Union, encouraged dialogue between the Turkish government and the leaders of the Kurdish community. Turkey is also party to the Paris Charter of 1990, obligating them to respect the rights of the country's minorities, including their "cultures, languages, and religion" (Muftuler-Bac 1997, 89). "In keeping with this obligation, in April 1991 the Turkish government permitted the use of the Kurdish language and recognized the existence of a Kurdish people in Turkey" (Muftuler-Bac 1997, 89). In March of 1994, the European Parliament even went so far as to adopt a resolution requesting the granting of autonomy for the Kurdish population in southeastern Turkey.

The unresolved human rights issues in Turkey still raise concerns, but progress has been demonstrated. In January 1987, "Turkey recognized the right of its citizens to make an individual application to the European Commission of Human Rights" (Muftuler-Bac 1997, 87). A Special Bureau within the Prime Minister's Office was also established to investigate all reported allegations of human rights abuses. A year later, in January 1988, "the Turkish government ratified both the UN and the European Conventions for prevention of torture...In 1991, a Ministry of Human Rights was established, with responsibility for supervising this observance of human rights in Turkey and for adapting the country to EC standards in this area" (Muftuler-Bac 1997, 88). Aside from reforms and improvements in the human rights area—for example, "some unprecedented in the Muslim world, such as a law against marital rape" (Tavernise 2006), Turkish officials have sought heavy political and economic reforms; in just four years, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey has managed to "get inflation down to historic lows and growth rates to all-time highs. The growing prosperity has eased integration of religious Turks into the country's self-conscious society, which is still suspicious of advocates of Islam, as well as of Mr. Erdogan and his pro-Islamic government" (Tavernise 2006). These economic reforms, coupled with recent human rights reforms, are sure to further Turkey's bid for E.U. membership.

PROGRESSION OF THE BID

Turkey has made many concessions and worked hard to convince the European Union that accession negotiations should move forward. The E.U. has been concerned mainly with the credibility of Turkey's reforms—whether they have been made in earnest or merely to secure membership (Ugur 1999). Are the reforms that the government of Turkey has made permanent and sincere, or are they merely a step towards securing funding and trading rights with its European neighbors? “Given the cost/incentive structure determined by state-society interaction in the E.U. and the probability of policy reversals in Turkey, the theory of endogenous policy-making would suggest that the E.U.'s risk-averse policy is rational and inevitable” (Ugur 1999).

Turkey has made reforms and progress in agriculture, economic policies, minority rights, human rights, and international conflicts. Though the population is increasingly identifying itself as Muslim, they still appear strongly committed to the secular politics of Mustafa Kemal. However, their support cannot go on indefinitely without a return on such an investment of time, energy, and commitment; the E.U. will have to make a good faith effort to move forward with negotiations and show that it, just as much as Turkey, is willing to see the process through to the end. If it does not put forth this effort, with the conservative tide in continental Europe showing no signs of relenting, the E.U. risks losing the hearts and minds of the Turkish population. The good news remains that the Turkish population appears to be moving more towards supporting secular, European-esque policies, rather than stringent Islamist policies. “The number of Turks in favor of imposing Sharia law declined to 9 percent from 21 percent, according to the survey, which was released last week” (Tavernise 2006). Now is the time for the E.U. to match the efforts of Turkey. Increased encouragement, not sanctions, will show the Turkish people that the E.U. is just as serious about their membership bid as they are.

THE NEXT STEP?

What is it to be truly European? Religion, history, culture: all are contestable. Pope Benedict XVI did not believe in Turkey's “Europeaness”. In his speech at Regensburg, “the Pope attempted to set out a European identity that is Christian by faith and Greek by philosophical reason. But Benedict's speech implicitly suggested that he believes that Islam has no such relationship to reason—and thus is excluded from being European” (Ramadan 2006). The Pope claimed that Turkey never has and never will be able to lay claim to European culture. Fortunately for Turkey and those European states that support its membership bid, the Roman pontiff changed his position immediately following his trip to Turkey in November 2006 (the first Muslim

country the new Pope has visited as the head of the Roman Catholic Church), a trip many considered an attempt at reconciliation. If someone that opposed to Turkish membership could have a change of heart, perhaps the conservatives in continental Europe do not serve as a final indicator of where the negotiation process is headed. If Turkey is willing to put forth the effort to prove its commitment to membership, and the E.U. is willing to accept it, religion may very well be able to take a back seat to politics, regardless of how large an impediment it seems to present; and considering that the E.U. has been willing to accept European Muslims in Eastern Europe, this does not seem at all implausible. Indeed, the most critical facet of negotiations at this stage proves to be the public opinions of current E.U. members, future E.U. members, and those in Turkey; for, in spite of the willingness of the governments involved in this process, both European and Turkish populations will have to relinquish their reservations and concerns about one another if the Turkey—E.U. partnership is to be a happy one.

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Rutgers Panel:
WINNING OR LOSING
THE WAR AGAINST TERROR?

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The following is an edited transcript of a high-profile discussion panel that was hosted at Rutgers University during the Fall 2005 semester. Entitled “*Winning or Losing the ‘War on Terrorism’?*”, the panel sought to establish an academic setting for the discussion of a topic that, despite being foremost in our national consciousness, was furthest from our understanding at the time. By bringing together prominent intellectuals on the subjects of international law, the Middle East, and U.S. foreign policy, the panel sought to fill an important gap in the discussion by adding analytical clarity and exposing students to the different dimensions of the debate, ranging from global politics and foreign policy to political violence and human rights. The questions that were put forth before the panelists were highly relevant at the time. Nearly eighteen months have passed, and yet these questions remain as pertinent today as they were on the eve of the panel, nor are they likely to disappear in the foreseeable future. As Americans, and as conscientious members of the international community, we are bound to face these issues again and again, and to struggle for their resolution as we pursue the dream of peace and collective security.

This panel was the culmination of several months of meticulous planning and hard work on behalf of the Rutgers chapter of the United Nations Association of U.S.A (RUNASA). At the time the panel was organized, RUNASA was a small group of like-minded and dedicated undergraduates who, like many students around the country, were unable to find a forum to fully explore the ideas they thought to be relevant in today’s world. The panel became that forum. It brought together both professors and students who were interested in hearing what these panelists had to say about an issue that was weighing on everyone’s mind. The invigorating discussion that followed was the result of subtle but poignant exchanges between panelists who clearly held stances on various points of the political spectrum.

RUNASA would like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to the Political Science Department, and especially to Dr. Michael Shafer, whose guidance and support was as constructive as it was relentless. RUNASA also thanks Dean Kay-Lynch, of University College, under whose auspices

RUNASA was able to secure the financial resources to put on this event. Finally, as a personal note, I would like to express my hope that, by publishing the panel's proceedings in RUWAR we have in some way prompted you, the reader, to take action with respect to questions and issues that perplex you today.

—*Boris Gorshkov*
Co-founder and former President,
RUNASA

AS WE FIND OURSELVES EMBARKING UPON A FOURTH YEAR in the “War on Terror”, we are obliged to reexamine our motives and our goals. The eradication, or perhaps containment, of political terror cannot be achieved if we continue on our current course of ambiguity—so far are we from understanding how to combat and prevent terrorism, that we cannot even say for sure who a terrorist is, and what causes him or her to behave in the way he or she does. It is the quest for this fundamental understanding that underlies the debate held during the Rutgers symposium entitled, “Winning or Losing the Global War on Terror.”

The panelists who participated in the discussion were Richard A. Falk, Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice Emeritus, Princeton University, and board chair, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation; Jamal R. Nassar, chair and professor, Department of Politics and Government, Illinois State University; and Waleed Hazbun, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University. The moderator for this panel was Eric Davis, a Professor in the Political Science Department at Rutgers New Brunswick.

Throughout the discussion, the panelists sought to challenge our conventional notions of terrorism and political violence, and to dislodge certain habits of mind that have prevented us from taking a wider view of the subject. In particular, it was argued that the term “terrorist” is often nothing more than a political label, and that answers to the all-important question “Who is a terrorist?” can be entirely subjective. By using the idea of terrorism in this self-serving manner, we are not leaving much room for the establishment of a meaningful discourse—an inconsistent and entirely personal definition of terrorism prevents us from finding out what is going on behind the semantics.

Determined to avoid engaging in a war of labels, members of the panel emphasized the importance of speaking in a common language, and of tracing the roots of terrorism back to its historical origins in hopes of discovering some clear and unadulterated meaning along the way. It was observed that there is an obvious discrepancy between the modern usage of the term and its use during the time of the French Revolution. The panelists gave brief consideration to this phenomenon, and outlined the similarities and differences between state and

non-state actors of terrorism, hoping in this way to arrive at a clear picture of the domain of terrorism.

Despite the importance of history, the panelists were keenly interested in observing the contemporary causes and the various interpretations of terrorist acts. The importance of understanding the motives behind global terrorism, and of understanding them within an international context, cannot be overstressed. The role of America in the midst of a post-9/11 world, and in particular its role in the 'War on Terror', was a central topic of conversation, alongside the many additional concerns that terrorism has raised for U.S. foreign relations.

The different backgrounds and varying perspectives that the panelists brought with them to the discussion served to create a wholesome and invigorating debate. This diversity was best reflected in the examples they provided as proof for their arguments, which ranged from observations on the French Revolution to the recent politics of the Middle East. Within the scope of their wide-ranging debate, it is certain that we will all find something that will help us to better understand the nature of political violence, and to grasp the direction of this 'War on Terror' in which we find ourselves engaged.

■ **Jamal Nassar :**

Essentially, I define “terrorism” as a political label given to people who are perceived to be planning or carrying out acts of violence for political objectives. Why do I define terrorism as a political label? I do that because, as you probably know, history most often is not written by heroes—history is written by those who hang heroes. It is those who hang heroes who give this label.

When I was born in Jerusalem, there was terrorism going on at the time, but the terrorist organizations were not called Al-Qaeda, or Hamas, or Islamic Jihad, or Hezbollah, or whatever group we now label as a terrorist organization, instead they were called Stern Group and the like. Their leaders were not Bin Laden, but instead people called Shamir, Menachem Begin, and Sharon. The British authorities considered them to be terrorists, and there were posters out there talking about wanted terrorists. So the terrorists of yesterday became the leaders later on of the state of Israel. So it’s a label and we need not be stuck as political scientists on labels. We need to get beyond them and not allow politicians to feed us labels.

Very often in this country our media and our politicians dismiss great events, great people, and great causes by giving them labels. In the past, this has involved calling someone a “strongman”, or a “dictator”, or a “Marxist leader.” I myself don’t want to dismiss any people with an adjective.

Terrorism under the definition I gave you can occur at the hands of individuals, groups, or governments. When our government orders troops to go bomb in Baghdad, or Fallujah, or anywhere in Iraq, and a father, mother, and six children die, that seventh child who was not home, maybe he is eleven or thirteen years old, he will probably devote the rest of his life to getting revenge. Do I call that individual a terrorist or a human being driven into acts of violence? That again is in the eye of the beholder; I would rather not be engaged in labels.

■ **Walled Huzbun :**

I too agree that the term “terrorism” doesn’t have a very useful analytical

purpose. Most times you hear it, it is used in the context of a particular rhetoric or discourse that is serving some other purpose. Nonetheless, I do think it has some role in understanding political violence. To understand some of its meaning, you can trace it back to the French Revolution, where, in the “Age of Terror”, it was first defined as a political use of terror. It was used in the context of consolidating the French Revolution. You can even see that, in this first instance, the use of violence and the threat of violence happened in a context that is not justified by a political order. There are all sorts of violent actions taken regularly by states and law enforcement agencies. We consider them to be just because they operate within a system of law, and if there is a violation, if that force is used unjustly, then you can see that it’s a violation of that law and there is a mechanism to punish the illegal use of violence. Within the context of the international system, it becomes more complicated, and I would defer to Richard Falk about international law issues.

I would like to come back to this notion of using violence in the context of seeking to establish order, and explore what conclusions it may give us. For instance, when it is used in the context of national liberation struggles, anti-colonial struggles, or even the early Zionist movements, terrorism is a means to establish order. The Algerian War of Independence was a movement wielding violence in an effort to promote the notion of national determination. The question becomes: Who defines who is a nation? Who has the right to constitute their own nation? You get the idea that this violence is occurring in a context where there is not an order, the actors are not recognized states, and the actors are operating outside an existing legal order. There are going to be terrorist movements when people find themselves in situations where their political aspirations are not being realized. This is precisely where I see the notion of political violence being outside of a context that can be understood as justifiable by law.

So what this discussion brings us is the understanding that there are gaps within the international system where there are political interests that don’t have legal methods of advocacy because they are not represented in the international system. If you go back to the notion of the rights of man, again coming back to the French Revolution, the unit in which those rights were contained was the nation. These civil rights were a product of defining the nation, of defining the community that the French lived in. Outside of that order of being a nation or nation-state, political violence doesn’t have the structure to justify it legally. My point is that the definition of terrorism comes from a context where there is violence operating outside the legal order. Rosa Parks passed away

recently and what she did was active civil disobedience; she violated the law with an act of violence. It was a peaceful demonstration, but there were moments when demonstrators acted outside the law. These actions were justifiable because they led to a reconstruction of the political order into one that we now see as more just. Rosa Parks was operating within a proper system that had laws and a Supreme Court that could adjudicate those laws by interpreting the constitution. I see terrorism as acting in that space outside that system, and so the major question that I would like to ask in analyzing terrorism becomes: is the activity part of an effort to construct a new order? National liberation movements were movements by formerly colonized people who wanted to be actors in the international system; they wanted to be included in pre-existing national orders. Their objective was not to destroy the order, but to become included. We should analyze these situations by asking if this violence is part of an action of seeking to be incorporated—of establishing an order, or of destroying the order. That's the sort of analytical discussion I would like to bring to the conversation.

■ **Eric Davis :**

I think we can start by talking in a common language. If you were to ask most people, they might agree with a definition like this: terrorism is a pattern of using violence against civilian populations for political purposes or political ends carried out over a lengthy period of time. In other words, we don't really think of one event as characterizing terrorism, it has to be a pattern and it has to be over a lengthy period of time. That's the commonsensical understanding of the term, but let us perhaps use our time tonight to bring a little more rigor and analytical clarity to these terms. One of the first things we will see is that terrorism has a strong relative element to it, and you can't understand this term unless you put it into some sort of historical context.

Let me cite the following example. Pictures of Jimmy Carter are on TV these days—in fact, he's just written a fascinating book that attacks the radical right. But in any event, we see a picture of Carter with Menachem Begin, the former Prime Minister of Israel, and Anwar Sadat, the previous president of Egypt, signing the 1978 Camp David Accords. Going back to the late 1940s, we see that the same Begin who in 1978 would sign peace accords and receive the Nobel Peace Prize was at that time on Interpol's wanted criminal list—he was seen as a terrorist. Yasser Arafat, who was invited to the White House and shook hands with Yitzhak Rabin, was for many years defined in Israeli law as an outright criminal. So here you have an Israeli prime minister in 1991 shaking hands with

Arafat on the White House lawn. In light of this, I think we have to also begin to look at the term “terrorism” in a relative and contextualized nature.

In addition, many people have drawn our attention to terrorism in its state form. My son has recently been finishing up Kurt Vonnegut’s *Slaughterhouse-Five*. We see a prime example of state terrorism in Vonnegut’s description of the firebombing of the German city of Dresden during World War II, which really had nothing to do with military objectives, but rather was much more about trying to experiment with firebombing as a military mechanism. It is possible to classify the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as terrorism as well, because there is evidence to believe that the Japanese could have been surrounded, prevented from continuing the war, and forced to surrender. I am not convinced that the United States had to use nuclear bombs, but I do know that a lot of people wanted to use the opportunity to advance this particular type of weaponry.

Thus far, we’ve seen that we can start with a “common sense” definition that seems appropriate for the moment, but the minute we begin to look at it from a historical situation, or from the vantage point of states and not just nonstate actors, we see that the term really has a much broader scope than we gave it credit for. I think, as Professor Nassar mentioned, that terrorism is a “weapon of the weak”, and a weapon of war in an era in which it is increasingly difficult for states to engage in the type of warfare practiced during both World Wars and Vietnam. Admittedly, we have an exception in the form of the Bush administration, which wants to go into Iran and Syria, but we’ll leave that point out of this discussion. Increasingly, you are going to see that people outside the state who feel weak are attracted to the use of terrorism as a means to reach a political end.

At this point, I am more interested in the question: what are the causes of terrorism? We can try and define the term itself, but the real issue is to find out why people engage in terrorism—under what circumstances do they see it as applicable, and what are the normative dimensions? If you would for a moment think of yourself driving a car packed with thousands of pounds of explosives, 90 mph into Traves Hall, it is really quite hard to imagine yourself in that car, and to understand why you would blow yourself up. The point I am making is that a person who engages in suicide bombing is someone who has a psychological state very different from ours—they are discontented, often underprivileged, and have experienced a lot of terrible things. So, I think it is important to look at the causes of terrorism.

The other issue I would like to emphasize is the notion that terrorism here in the U.S. is a mechanism for closing off political debate. If there is anybody here in this room who knows what exactly an orange alert is, I've got money in my pocket for you, because I have no idea what that means. An orange alert seems to me to be a mechanism to frighten people and to force them to think within certain thought perimeters and to not raise other issues.

I am also concerned by what is going on in Guantanamo Bay. People were arrested, many of whom we know are innocent and who just happened to be in a kind of network during the American invasion of Afghanistan. It could be argued that Nazi war criminals got a better deal in 1945. Some of them were hung, which perhaps was not a better deal, but at least they got a trial. Theoretically, those "non-combatants" are in Never Never Land—they can stay in Guantanamo Bay indefinitely because it has no legal status. Being a part of Cuba, it's a base that has a 99-year lease to the United States, and that's why these people were taken there. This is a very frightening situation. A lot of us seem to overlook this situation because we think that Guantanamo is far away and that all these detainees are from other countries. In fact, some of them are American citizens, and the same mechanisms that are being used to deprive these people of their basic human rights can be used against us, American citizens, in the future.

■ **Richard Falk :**

Before I address the basic question of "what is terrorism?", let me make a couple of points. I think the first thing to realize is that the modern usage of the terminology arose in the context of the French Revolution and was associated exclusively with the use of violence by the state against its enemies. One of the interesting things to study in this time period is how the governments of states have succeeded in transferring this term of unacceptable criminalized violence from state violence to anti-state violence. Nowadays we use the terminology of terrorism almost exclusively, particularly in the United States, to refer to anti-state violence by non-state actors; a complete 180-degree reversal from the original connotation. I think it's a reversal in meaning that doesn't really help us in terms of understanding what the limits are in permissible and criminalized violence. If the terminology is to have any value, it should be associated not with the actor but with the object of violence. In other words, whoever engages in violence against innocent civilians is committing an act which constitutes terrorism, whether it's done with missiles, bombs or suicidal tactics. The dividing line should be the use

of violence against civilians; therefore we should be very careful of who we call terrorists in this contemporary situation, because the operations of the United States government in both Iraq and Afghanistan have relied on heavy-handed tactics that, even though perhaps they were not designed specifically to kill civilians, certainly have led to the deaths of many civilians in much larger numbers than the violence of the anti-state actors. Hence, when we ask the question, “What is terrorism?” we also are implicitly asking “Who is a terrorist?”, or “What is terrorism in this kind of global situation?”

A second issue that I think is important for understanding what a prior speaker referred to in terms of Guantanamo Bay is the post 9/11 sense that our government didn't understand how to respond effectively to the attacks against America. There was no enemy state being faced; the traditional experience of government, once they use the terminology of war, is to fight against other states that are territorial entities and have visible assets that could be designated as military targets. In this case, to the extent that the official version is a true story, there was no target to respond against in a warlike mode. It was quite possible to have reacted as Britain did in relation to the IRA, and France and other European governments have done in response to terrorism: namely, to consider it alongside other non-state violence, and thus treat it as a law enforcement problem. When the experience since 9/11 is carefully analyzed, one might say that the only effective actions against the Al-Qaeda network have been the result of law enforcement, and not the undertakings associated with war. A fundamental error was made by characterizing the attack of 9/11 as an act of war; it was such an action that validated a warlike discourse and response. Many of the troubles that have followed are a consequence of this fundamental categorization mistake.

PART II

Eric Davis :

What are the different types of states, or states and non-state actors in relation to terrorism? To what extent do these groups deserve the right to self-determination?

■ **Jamal Nassar :**

I think that the first part of this question has already been covered, so I don't have too much to add. To what extent they possess the right to self-determination depends on who they are. We are dealing here with people like the Palestinians, and the U.N. has told us that these people have the right to self-determination; this is what international law tells us. But if we were talking about the Zarqawi group in Iraq, then maybe they don't. It depends on who they are. We have to examine each on a case by case basis.

■ **Walled Huzbun :**

I agree with that, but I want to push the question a little further. I would like to say that it is possible to come up with a way to define which movements have a just right and which do not. You can refer to legitimizing institutions like the U.N., which passes resolutions through its General Assembly, or aspects of international law, in terms of which actors are seen as potential sovereigns in the international system. Thus, the United Nations and international law give legitimacy to causes such as that of the Palestinians. But then, if you take a look at the Kurdish question, do the Kurds have the right to self-determination? It is one thing to say that they do have this right to become a sovereign state, but there is another question we might ask, one that challenges the entire system of sovereign states.

Do people have certain rights, which are expressible only through sovereignty? Is sovereignty a condition that is supposed to create a context for realizing various individual rights and national aspirations? These individuals, or these groups and movements, are part of systems, territories, nations, or other legal orders that have mechanisms to deal with the promotion of their rights, their well-being, and their interests, and that becomes another way of defining and deciding it.

There are movements out there like that of Zarqawi that imagine a different sense of order, and we are inclined to dismiss their views as simply unjust, and claim that they are simply trying to destroy order. But before we do this, we are obliged to ask ourselves: Is the order as it exists

today, the one they are opposing, also unjust? In the era of decolonization, a lot of struggles were re-imagining what the international order should be like; having colonies, like Algeria, being considered a part of France, was seen as unjust.

Again, there is no way of creating one rule of defining what is just. This is where I think it enters the realm of politics; the realm of having global politics, about debating what is just order, and what are the different mechanisms for communities to realize their own well-being. There are going to be challenges to that order, some of them just and others unjust. If we look back at history, we see many challenges that today we see as being very just, such as challenges to slavery, and colonization, for example, but that might not have been the contemporary interpretation. After considering this, I think that we are at this period today where we have to figure out how the order as it is should be adjusted. Issues such as the global economy and globalization are creating forms of inequality or forms of marginalization of communities. Those become the issues about which we should debate. Does political violence have a role in transforming the current world order, as it has sometimes in challenges of the past? That is a more difficult question.

■ **Richard Falk :**

In international law, the right of self-determination is one that belongs to the people who can represent a people. What constitutes a “people” under international law is an evolving concept. The right of self-determination was initially invoked with respect to those societies that were governed by an alien power, such as a colonized people. After the breakup of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia, it has come to mean something very different. Whereas originally the right of self-determination had to be exercised within existing state boundaries, nowadays it might also mean fragmenting an existing territorial state.

The second issue here of importance is the following: if there is a right to self-determination, what kinds of force might legitimately be used to exercise that right? I think there is a fairly widespread agreement that, at least from a legal perspective, it is never part of the right of self-determination to engage in violence against civilians. In other words, anti-civilian violence—which is in my view the best way of thinking about terrorism—is never justifiable, no matter whether the actor is seeking self-determination or to prevent the exercise of this right of self-determination.

Eric Davis :

I think it's very interesting that the whole terminology of terrorism has framed this whole discussion in a very specific way. It seems to me that when you ask the question of state-versus-nonstate terrorism, you also need to consider the existence of an entire process of non-violent action that is a way of either bringing about the right of self-determination, or of opposing a repressive state that uses violence. One thing that has really been brought home to me over many years of studying the Middle East is that the use of violent revolution and resistance has brought a debased politics—often it gives repressive states even greater power. For example, Palestinian violence has allowed the Israeli government to create a structure of oppression and violence, and if you juxtapose that to, say, Gandhi's civil disobedience, or, as Walled Huzbun just mentioned, Rosa Parks in the U.S., or if you think about the types of policies that Nelson Mandela pushed in South Africa even though the African National Congress sometimes did resort to violence, you can't help but notice that there have been successful alternatives to political violence. And yet there are obviously many people who still see terrorism as the best strategy. We should address the real issue here, not just the issue of terrorism, even though terrorism is important. 9/11 is not a fiction, it is something that happened. The issue of protecting a country against violence is not a bogus one, but the more important issue is: what are the processes of global inequality that lead people to engage in terrorism?

PART III

Eric Davis :

How does Islamic extremism fit into the equation of terrorism? What are the differences between Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic extremism? How can the peaceful majority of the Islamic community contribute to the fight against terrorism?

■ **Jamal Nassar :**

I am glad that a question like this was posed. Anytime we talk about terrorism, the image that comes to mind in this country is Islamic terrorism. It's always extremist Muslims, and we refer to them by some label and dismiss them as extremists and fundamentalists. If a Muslim carries out some act of violence that involves civilians, the label is given immediately—a headline in the paper says “Islamic terrorist”. But if a Christian carries out the same act, it says “Timothy McVeigh”. If an Israeli Jew carries out such an act, the headline says “Baruk Goldstein” or “Yigal Amir”. There is something fundamentally wrong with how we throw around labels. Unless we begin to correct this, and to act fairly, and treat everyone equally in our use of this label of terrorism, we will continue to create more problems for ourselves in the future. If we listen to the words of politicians and the media, suicide bombing seems to be just the domain of Islamic fundamentalists. They forget that most suicide bombing incidents have been committed by Hindu Tamil Tigers. If you don't believe me, go look up a book by Robert Pape of the University of Chicago—all the numbers are there. Islamic suicide bombers are much fewer and the deaths are a lot fewer, but we don't hear about the Tamil Tigers. We only hear about Islamic bombings, and we forget that suicide killing has been a part of history for a long time. In, fact we can go back and find legends in the Torah about a suicide killer that Christians and Jews glorify. If you remember the story of Samson in the Bible, he was blinded and they were going to feed him to the lions. As a desperate human being, he brought down the temple, killing himself and all the innocent spectators around. If we can find it within ourselves to glorify Samson, then we should at least begin to try to understand the modern suicide bomber.

■ **Walled Huzbun :**

If terrorism or suicide bombing is analyzed as a means of political violence or as a tactic, one cannot generalize because different movements start in different ways. Some individuals might be marginalized with their own psychological problems while others see themselves as soldiers, defined by

a mission, or an ideology they may believe in, which causes them to see themselves as playing a functional role in a political movement. When analyzed in a technical, materialist way, it's an efficient and accurate tactic. This is one of the reasons why it develops. The logic behind engaging in violence in the first place is one question, but the tactic they choose can be analyzed separately. In developing that tactic, they develop rhetoric and ideology to go along with it. They have to redefine notions of martyrdom since, for example, in Islam, suicide is banned or seen as unjust. So, the ideology often follows the development of military logic. In a sense, we can analyze the Tigers but we cannot fully understand them unless we have considered the context of how they develop.

I want to bring up the opportunity to compare different movements. One can look at Hamas and compare it to Al-Qaeda. In terms of programs, and the order the groups are seeking to establish, they are very different. Hamas has a nationalist movement, it has its own alternative imagination of what it sees as construction of territory and nationhood, but it is part of the context of challenging the existing order and redefining it. Hamas is defining itself as a nation-state, and seeks to construct itself in a particular way contested by other Palestinian nationalist movements.

If you look at what President Bush is redefining as the “War on Terrorism”, as a war on Islamic extremism, it brings up this notion that there are different ways of imagining the international order. Some ways are the product of the failure of the current international order. If you look through the history of state building, most of the Middle East States, the Arab states, were constructed as a product of the mandate system. The states the countries held were set up for the strategic interests of the colonial powers. They were not set up to respond to the needs and interests of the nations. As Professor Davis mentioned, Arab intellectuals are now coming to realize that the violent revolutions that sought to overturn those mandate states have left them with authoritarian states in eras of tyranny. There is now a realization spreading amongst the intellectual elite that, even whilst they appeared to be overturning the colonial order, the mandate states were in reality operating with severe limitations. The notion that Islamic extremism is seeking to challenge political ideologies stems from the idea that they see the system of state building, both within their world and elsewhere, as illegitimate. If you look into the extremist ideologies, they trace back to the notion that their states were not developed within authentic roots, i.e., within a sense of authority in the moral codes of Islam. This is in some ways a dissident strain of Islamic political thought, but I think it's important that we

begin to realize what the different challenging orders are. Although we must recognize that these particular extremist ideologies exist, the problem with the current notion of the “War on Terrorism” is precisely that it holds out only one version of an extremist ideology, when there is an entire range of challenges to the order of states that exists outside the scope of that definition: there’s the lack of democracy, the lack of states that have realized their own self-determination in the context of the American projection of power in the region, and there’s an effort to promote American interests. This constrains the autonomy of regional states because they find themselves in a situation where their options are severely limited.

As far as what the peaceful Islamic majority can contribute to the fight against terror, well, it’s not up to the Muslim community alone, but instead it’s up to the global community to consider first the history of state building in the post-colonial era, and to recognize how these processes were alienating to their communities. Only then can we move political processes towards generating more authentic political systems; those that speak and incorporate the needs of the people. In the case of Turkey, the state began its state-building project in a harsh, quasi-secularizing method, but recently, through a kind of democratic process, began to incorporate more aspects of religion and religious practice into its political system.

■ **Richard Falk :**

The first point that I would like to make is that it is understandable on one level that the West, particularly the United States, is preoccupied with Islam and Islamic terrorism. After all, 9/11 emanated from an Islamic source. The Islamic region of the world, particularly the Arab region, has been a crucible of tension throughout recent history: the Israeli conflict, the Iranian revolution, and the oil boycott of the 1970s to name a few crises. There is a deep engagement of the West, particularly of the U.S., in seeking to pursue a sound geopolitical strategy by having a controlling influence on events in the Islamic world. As Professor Davis is asking us to consider, why is this violence happening? Why these extremists? I think there are some quick answers to this. First, there are important, legitimate grievances in the Arab world that have not been addressed satisfactorily by the Arab governments. There is a sense of deep frustration throughout the Arab countries in particular, and the Islamic world in general, that there is no capacity for effective resistance. In that respect, although the extremist forms of violence are horrific, they represent the first truly effective display of effective capacity by the Islamic world to inflict harm on those

whom most of its people believe are responsible for harming them. So we have to look at the failure of Arab governments as one of the explanations. Also, we must look at the Western agenda of dominating and exploiting the region as a second dimension. The third dimension rests in the failure to resolve the Palestinian struggle in a just war. The Palestinian struggle is not just about the Palestinians—it's about the capacity of the Arab world as a whole to obtain some kind of justice in relation to their legitimate grievances. Until the grievances are addressed, one must expect what we perceive to be extreme forms of response, because from the Islamic perspective, the oppression itself is extreme. So it depends a lot on the subjectivity of who is assessing the conflict that has been occurring in the region and in the world for the last several decades.

■ **Eric Davis :**

I would just like to draw your attention back to a question of terminology. The Koran specifically and categorically condemns the killing of innocents. I want to raise this issue in relationship to a pet peeve of mine, which is the notion of defining terrorist activity under the rubric of Islamic fundamentalism. What does “fundamentalism” mean? Fundamentalism means going back to the essentials of religion. We have many examples of that in the Muslim World, such as the renaissance movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Some of you may have heard of Sheikh Muhammad Abdu, who argued at the end of the 19th century that the problem with Islam was that it was deviating too much from its fundamental principles, and you couldn't see the forest for the trees.

People who are engaging in violent acts are not fundamentalists. They are not going back to the fundamentals of Islam, because it explicitly condemns the killing of innocents. So when we are talking about fundamentalism, it's a misnomer. When we look at instances where people are engaging in political violence under the rubric of Islam, under the rubric of Judaism, under the rubric of Hinduism—for example, killing a lot of Muslims in India on a train a few years ago or burning down mosques—or under the rubric of Christianity, this is not fundamentalism we are seeing, but what I would call the invention of religion, and the promotion of a political agenda where people tried to mobilize religion to give that political agenda greater strength. So let's not use the term “Islamic fundamentalism” to refer to groups that are seen as engaging in terrorist attacks.

Eric Davis :

What are the underlying causes of global terrorism? Can terrorists have legitimate grievances? How does a lack of peaceful channels to communicate such grievances contribute to the rise of global terrorism?

■ Jamal Nassar :

Clearly, this is an outstanding question, and we've touched on it already. Clearly, our understanding of terrorism suffers from the suspension of any inquiry into causation. There are many causes of terrorism—the struggle for justice, for sovereignty, independence, or simply, for freedom. Terrorism could also be tied to other issues and concerns. It can be ethnic or individual. If we deal with state terrorism, it might relate more to state power or to resources. For all these reasons, I refuse to think of terrorism solely as the domain of non-state actors. Some of the causes could be that the state wants more power, wants more resources, wants more of advantages they need, and therefore they engage in terrorist attacks. And states do these things.

On the issue of legitimate grievances and how to communicate them, I agree that terrorism by non-state actors is a form of “participation by other means.” When people find themselves deprived and outside the system, unable to control their own political or economic destiny, or when they see themselves totally controlled by others and there is no other channel to express themselves, they tend to engage in terrorism. We have seen that in the Palestinian movement. I remember reading the work of Laila Khalid, a Palestinian who hijacked an El Al airliner and was captured in London. When she was asked why she chose to do it, her astounding answer was, “I hijacked the Boeing in order that you ask ‘why?’” After the hijacking, people indeed began to ask why the Palestinians were reacting in such a way, and in the process they learned about the Palestinian struggle. They learned of the oppression against the Palestinians, so in the minds of those who carried out and organized these acts, the lack of other means of spreading awareness sometimes leads to acts that often are viewed as forms of terrorism.

I agree with Dr. Davis, about the notion of Islamic fundamentalism. Most experts on the Middle East and Islam would not label Islamic extremists as fundamentalists. The experts usually use the concept of Islamists when referring to the ideology of bringing politics into religion by using all types of tools for political objectives. Islam becomes a political ideology, called “Islamism”, rather than “Islamic fundamentalism”.

“Islamic fundamentalism” refers to anybody who believes in the fundamental teachings of the religion.

■ **Walled Huzbun :**

One question to be answered is: Why use violence against civilians? You may have a state seeking to consolidate power, in the context of the French Revolution, and in seeking to consolidate power they used violence against civilians because they wanted to impose authority. So if we are to say, as we did earlier, that the resort to violence can be seen in the context of certain political grievances, then we are obliged to answer this question: why target civilians to redress political grievances? What is the logic behind that?

In answering this question, it helps to consider what’s being threatened. In the context of a struggle for national liberation, an anti-colonial struggle, for instance, attacking the civilians of the colonial power was seen as means to inflict violence on the colonial power. From a tactical point of view, these victims are the most vulnerable, and so it’s the easiest way for the movement to inflict violence. But what is the consequence of that? How does the colonial power choose to respond? How does it best protect its citizens? Perhaps by withdrawing? Studies on terrorism have shown that terrorism is highly correlated to actual occupation. This violence is often employed against occupying forces that see themselves as democracies, and a major component of their mission is to protect the security of civilians. Thus, attacking civilians is one way of undermining their mission. That is one thing to keep in mind.

Another important concern in analyzing this is to differentiate between the notion of legitimate use and what are the implications of the violence, in the sense that particular acts of violence will have certain political consequences. The end result might not be a more just or democratic order, but it will have consequences in terms of a movement; of being able to inflict violence on a state or some other actor.

The last bit I will mention is the notion of terrorism versus international terrorism. Bruce Hoffmann is one of these terrorist experts. In his book on terrorism, he looks at the early Zionist movement and sees them as the last movement within the anti-colonial struggle, but then he brings up the role of Palestinian terrorism, and for him, this is the first invention, or instance, of international terrorism. Now how does this work? Well, one of the notions is that the civilian targets were often not from the occupying power, instead they were people on these international airliners. It brings up the understanding that the context of their grievances was a political order constructed not just by a single

occupying power; but by the dominant powers within the international system. I think this helps a great deal in understanding forms of international terrorism as opposed to forms that are best explained by the traditional model of resisting territorial occupation.

■ **Richard Falk :**

Well, I would emphasize the impotence of secular politics as probably the most important cause of what we are calling terrorism in the Islamic world. In particular, we should view this in light of the comparable seeming effectiveness of Islamically-oriented political movements, starting with the Iranian Revolution. See, I think that the Iranian Revolution was the first successful instance of resistance to the domination of the region by Western interests.

The success of the expulsion of Western domination was not an experience that was lost on the rest of the Islamic world, particularly the Arab region. Again, the inability of the secular political perspectives, either within the region, or from without the region, to address legitimate grievances and right certain wrongs has to do a lot with the failures of American diplomacy to address the Palestinian struggle. I think that this failure led to the emergence of a widespread double belief, the first aspect of which is that the only way to satisfy legitimate grievances is through violence. The U.N. has repeatedly expressed support for the Palestinian cause, but in the end, it was violent forms of resistance that led to an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

The second aspect of this unfortunate development is that only those elements in the Islamic world that separate themselves sharply from the West have a deep engagement with solving these legitimate grievances. Organizations like Hamas and the Iranian Revolution are part of a pattern; unlike the secular institutions, these movements confronted the West, confronted the U.S., and at least seemed to be deeply engaged in a process of seeking to achieve results. Given this history, it is hardly surprising that these movements enjoy the level of popular support that they do in the Middle East.

SHI'I CLERICAL FORCES
AND THE DIRECTION
OF THE MIDDLE EAST

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The regional schema of the Middle East has altered its composure over the last few years. The United States' invasion of Iraq highlighted the dramatic influence of Shi'a Islam in the region that had been lying dormant for decades. Largely overshadowed by Sunni militarism and Arab nationalism, Shi'a did not truly begin to get noticed until the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. However, the face put to Shi'ism in association with that event was simpler than that which today's policymakers face. The sect's theology and leadership is more complicated than a mere rhetorical association of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini with evil. Shi'ism is not universally dominated by a revolutionary and populist ideology. Today's Shi'ism is, however, inseparably intertwined with the politics of the religion's adherents.

Shi'ism is the dominant branch of Islam in only a few areas of the world, and its center inarguably lies in Iran. The population of Iran is 89% Shi'i, while Iraq hovers around 60–65% and Lebanon at 36% (CIA World Factbook). Other Shi'i communities worth noting are Pakistan's nearly 34 million Shi'a, India's nearly 20 million, Turkey's estimated 14.5 million, and the Persian Gulf's collective 21% minority, including a Bahraini majority (Adherents.com 2007). The influence each community exerts on its country's respective political spectrum differs from state to state, commonly finding themselves competing with other religious groups—usually Sunni Muslims.

The political situation of each Shi'i community depends greatly upon the size of the demographic in relation to other groups. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the most influential clerics in the Shi'i world today. This report will generally focus on three particular Muslim populations—Iranians, Iraqis and Lebanese; while not discounting the significance of large Shi'i populations in Pakistan, or political turbulence in the Persian Gulf, which also warrant significant attention and study for an understanding of Shi'i politics in the region.

These countries are significant for different reasons, and their study is interesting because of the extensive links the three demographics have to each other and their intimate political strategic dealings. These connections run through the Iraqi seminary city of Najaf, where many of these scholars studied. The *'ulama*, or the Arabic term for Shi'i clerics, tend to study in central locations and develop close personal relationships with classmates from different corners of the Shi'i world. The Iranian Shi'a *'ulama* have been the most influential over the course of the last three decades, due largely to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's Islamic Revolution. The establishment of a religiously-oriented state in Iran changed the strategic composition of the region and the balance of power in regards to prominent clerics.

In Lebanon, the establishment of Hizbullah has been the most successful extension of Iran's revolutionary ideology. Its strength, both politically and militarily, even more so its widespread popularity, make its leaders paramount in leading the Lebanese Shi'i community. Their predecessors, the Lebanese Islamic Da'wa and the militia Amal, play into Hizbullah's development, and their legacies still impact Lebanese Shi'i culture today.

Iraq's Shi'i community demonstrates a balance between Iran and Lebanon, and the most important center of communal development for the religion today, with Najaf again being central to this development. Following the US-led invasion of Iraq, debates about the future of the country's political structure mirrored those that took place in Iran after the 1979 revolution. Additionally, the fall of Saddam Hussein has allowed the Iraqi Shi'i community to prosper culturally and religiously, reinvigorating the centuries-old prominent centers of Shi'i learning.

The leaders mentioned in this paper will include past and present religious, often political leaders. These clerics wield the influence to shift the outlook of the Middle East, and have demonstrated their willingness to use it. To understand the complex outlook of these clerics and their current or potential political influence, one must first look at the controversial system of government conceived by Ayatollah Khomeini.

The paper is organized based on an imprecise timeline. The sections on Iran, Lebanon, and Iraq have been ordered in the sequence of three major events that have been the integral factors in the current framework of Shi'i regional politics, each of which occurred in these three countries in the same respective order chronologically. The events are the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the 1975-1989 Lebanese Civil War, and the 2003 US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. While the Lebanese Civil War began before Iran's Islamic Revolution, this paper's section on Lebanon deals with post-revolutionary Iran's involvement during the civil war. Above all, this emphasizes the primary importance of the Islamic Revolution in modern Middle Eastern Shi'i politics.

Despite the emphasis on this particular selection of events being centered in each respective country, the reader is urged to appreciate that the situations in all three of these countries are considerably intertwined. In order to avoid confusion, the reader should view the accounts in different sections as parts of a single narrative, and not try to separate events in one country from events in another. Each section refers to events in the other two countries quite often. As an example, consider the involvement of Iraqi scholars in the Iranian revolution, Iranian governmental involvement in the Lebanese Civil War, and Iranian or Hizbullah influence in modern Iraq.

Iran's struggle for change under authoritarian rule has its roots decades into the past, well ahead of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Persian Constitutional Revolution established the area's first constitution in 1906, perhaps the country's most influential document since Cyrus the Great's Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The short-lived constitution allotted for parliamentary representation and maintained a minimal advisory role for the Iranian 'ulama, or its clerical body. However, the rise to power of Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1925 would end this constitutional period in Iranian history (Afary 1996; Browne 1995).

Waliyat-i Faqih, Arabic for "the Guardianship of the Jurist" (we will refer to it in its Persianized form, *Velayat-e Faqih*), is a concept that was introduced by Khomeini during his time in exile in Najaf, Iraq. It was best articulated during a lecture series-turned-book called "Hukoumat-e Islami" (or "Islamic Government"), which Khomeini published after years of research and theoretical development. Delivering a lecture series in Najaf in 1971, Khomeini argued that only Islamic jurists had the right to administer a modern state. Islamic law was inherently the only law applicable in an Islamic society, and only its most learned scholars, the 'ulama, could apply it correctly (Nasr 2006, 125). Additionally, the most learned of the *fuqaha* (jurists) would be the one with the most right to rule and he would gain that status via the recognition of his contemporary scholars. His status would be that of a deputy to the 12th imam, and by being the most learned, pious, just and selfless of jurists, he would thereby be closest to the 12th imam in his occultation (Naquvi 2006). According to Islamic law, government is a function of God—it exists in order to implement the laws which He mandated (Brown 2000, 172).

What Khomeini advocated was the creation of a government based on the rulings of a single great cleric. This idea was strongly influenced by Plato's concept of the philosopher king in his renowned "Republic," surely a consequence of Khomeini's early reading of the great philosophers (Nasr 2006, 126). But more than the great Greek philosophers, or even the scholars under which he learned (who are considered among Shi'a to be the greatest of the last century), it was the oppressive political climate of the Shah's Iran that had the most profound influence on Khomeini's ideology.

Having been exiled to Najaf following two arrests by Iranian authorities, he advocated against the regime abroad as he did at home. So much was his influence felt near the end of the Shah's reign that Saddam Hussein himself offered Reza Pahlavi a complimentary assassination of the fiery religious leader. In an ironic twist of fate that would eventually capsized his own regime, Pahlavi rejected the offer.

The ideas of Khomeini's Islamic Republic spread quickly, and were published

almost immediately in Persian and in Arabic in Beirut in 1976 (Martin 2003, 115). More importantly, however, his message was recorded and disseminated by tape. These recorded tapes were key in popularizing his revolutionary ideas and the justifications for his political ideology in Islamic *Shari'a*. He chastised the so-called “quietist” clerics, who espoused the idea that *ulama* should avoid participating in government. To some, this practice was a demonstrated reluctance by the clergy to involve itself in politics, but to many others it contravened religious duty to do so. This activism-versus-quietism debate had a wide audience and generated a great deal of interest throughout the seminary world of Najaf. Accompanied in his critiques by theologians like Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Khomeini was able to overthrow the Shah’s regime with his ideology, and add a spark to modern Shi’ism.

ABUL QASIM AL-KHOI AND OTHER SHI’I VIEWS OF VELAYAT-E FAQIH

There was very little in the way of conformity to the revolutionary Ayatollah’s opinions among the Shi’i scholarly community. Khomeini’s main rival in this regard, and indeed an opponent of several key elements of his theory, was Ayatollah Abul Qasim al-Khoi. No mere ordinary cleric, Khoi was at the time regarded as the most revered cleric in the Shi’i world. Khomeini and Khoi did not like each other, and often found their students arguing the opinions of the elder scholars with one another. In fact, the entire series of lectures that Khomeini gave on the subject of Islamic government are said to have been a response to a criticism posed by one of Khoi’s students¹.

Often, Khomeini’s polemics bordered on the paranoid, while being undoubtedly prejudicial. He would interpret verses such as “Obey those among you who have authority” to refer to religious judges. By itself, this is a common position, but Khomeini went on to claim that anything contradicting this view was either a misinterpretation or the product of deliberate misdirection (Abrahamian 2003, 124; Brown 2000, 172). Khoi was not interested in what he perceived as mere rhetoric. He confronted Khomeini with an argument that *velayat-e faqih* was concocted without the support of *Shari'a* (Nasr 2006, 125). Khoi’s sentiments were echoed by Iranian *ulama* as well, such as fellow Azeri-cleric Ayatollah Muhammad Kazem Shariatmadari.

According to Khoi, an authority like that described by Ayatollah Khomeini would be limited in his administrative abilities. But this view can be vague—it may also allow Ayatollahs to issue decrees which should be followed by the community, both obligatory and prohibitive. However, Khoi’s most famous student and now the most respected of the *ulama*, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, clarifies this point. While Khomeini viewed supreme rule as a divine privilege,

1. It is unclear whether this is an exaggeration on the part of Western thinkers or if it is simply being played down by Shi’i scholars.

Sistani argues that, when “social order is linked, *velayat-e faqih* and enforcement of *velayat* (government) depend on certain conditions, one of which is the popularity and acceptability of the *faqih* among the majority of worshippers” (Khalaji 2006).

This is a significant contravention to Khomeini’s doctrine. If a jurist is not socially accepted, his authority is questionable. Today, in the case of Iran, such an idea would spell problems for the governmental structure, which is heavily dependent on its founding doctrine to justify a position like the Supreme Leadership. Iran’s system of government does a poor job of promoting the concept of religious rule, and it factors into Iranians’ disillusionment toward the idea. Iranians maintain a significant opposition to the status quo. The opening up of Iraq and the developing system of government there is presenting itself as an alternative for the many still-religious Iranians who are unhappy with the current system of government in Iran. This idea will be developed further in the Iraq section of this text.

Initially, Iranian clerics had been willing to disagree with the opinions of Khomeini, as is traditional in a legalistic culture like that of the *‘ulama*. What was new to this culture was Ayatollah Khomeini’s suppression of dissent, which had not gone unnoticed by the *‘ulama* inside and outside of Iran. Ayatollah Shariatmadari became one of the first clerics to fall to Khomeini’s expurgation, being implicated in a high-level assassination attempt and placed under house arrest. He originally recognized Khomeini as a Grand Ayatollah in 1963, but he eventually deviated in his support for the cleric. He was known to have supported traditional Shi’i positions and worked closely with conservative and moderate clerics (Keddie 2006, 193). Shariatmadari’s support for the reinstatement of the 1906–07 Constitution also contributed to a significantly different approach to government that would also be later applied to Iraq (Keddie 2006, 193).

Another Ayatollah worth noting is Mahmud Taleqani, who chastised the Shah’s dictatorship for having allusions toward idolatry. He tended to favor left-wing views on social issues that gave him some appeal with non-religious revolutionaries in Iran before the Shah’s ouster. Additionally, he favored a decentralization of the *marja’-e taqlid*, the cleric or clerics to whom the Shi’a faithful looked for answers on moral, ethical and religious questions (Keddie 2006, 198). In theory, this would have worked powerfully against the concept of *velayat-e faqih*, which prefers the centralization of authority around the top *marja’* and his clerical upper echelon. As it were, it served mostly to bridge gaps between religious and Marxist revolutionaries during the Iranian Revolution and its aftermath.

One cleric who might have had a lasting effect on the Middle East and on post-war Iran was Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, the one-time heir-apparent

to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. By the late 1980s, he openly questioned the authoritarian tendencies of Khomeini's *velayat-e faqih*. He began openly opposing Khomeini's policies, including a mass execution of political dissidents in 1988. He described Iran as a primer for rather than an exporter of the Islamic Revolution, a direct affront to Iranian policies in the Shi'a world, especially Lebanon. His increasing outspokenness and apparent resentment for Khomeini led to his sanctioning and house arrest, which continues to this day. Despite his imprisonment, he has continued maintaining contacts with his students and making statements even today (Keddie 2006, 260). In one of his more recent speeches, he decried the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq for desecrating holy sites in Najaf, Karbala and Kufa (Nasr 2006, 176).

However, senior Iranian clerics viewed the constitution as too overwhelming, installing virtually tyrannical power into the hands of a clerical elite. Khomeini subsequently had the country's constitution altered to reflect the growing discontent over his theory amongst the Iranian *'ulama*. The consequences of this move include the gradual politicization of the post of Supreme Leader. The religious credentials needed for the post were reduced. This opened up the position to less-learned clerics, compromising on his resolved position, the intellectual standing of the leader, and the need to install the most learned of clerics to power. The ensuing selection of Ali Khamenei as *faqih*, coupled with the ultimate demise of Khomeini would change things in the Shi'i world.

Long before Ayatollah Ali Sistani and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei began their modern rivalry, the bitter dispute between Khoi and Khomeini dominated the politics of the *'ulama*. This was the case throughout the 1970s. Khoi's resistance to Khomeini's doctrines cannot be underappreciated. The quietist philosophy he lived was something to which many of his students would hold, most notably Sistani. Among his other influential students were Grand Ayatollahs Muhammad Ishaq al-Fayyad, Bashir al-Najafi al-Pakistani, Said al-Hakim and their representatives in Iraq and elsewhere in the Shi'i world (Nasr 2006, 190). It is this set of clerics that today hold significant grievances against the current structure of the Iranian government.

THE FORMATION OF AMAL AND THE RISE OF HIZBULLAH

Lebanon has a rich history of giving rise to prominent clerics, and one of Lebanon's more notable clerics in recent times was Musa al-Sadr. His decision to involve himself in Lebanese politics spurred much controversy at the time, as it contravened an established school of quietist religious legal philosophy.

The Iraqi city of Najaf provides a fertile ground for understanding the close clerical and political relations between Iranian and Lebanese Shiites'. Would-be theologians came from all over the Shi'i world to study with the most learned

scholars in Najaf. Owing to Islam's negative attitude toward tribalism and nationalism, students were free to develop strong and close relationships with each other (Nakash 2006, 136). In fact, when Saddam Hussein began his persecution of Shi'a in Iraq, it touched off a series of events that culminated in the formation of Lebanon's longest lasting militia.

Saddam Hussein's government deported foreign clerics in droves from the Shi'i seminaries, sending many Lebanese clerics back home. These refugees brought with them the seeds of what would soon become the Lebanese version of the opposition Iraqi Da'wa party. Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya had its foundations in Musa al-Sadr's cousin, Muhammad Baqir. Musa also contributed his share to the cause by founding several major Islamic organizations. *Harakat al Mubrumun* ("The Movement of the Disinherited") was formed to address the concerns of the Shi'a of Lebanon. At the onset of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, a militia wing, Amal, was added to the organization's ranks.

The Lebanese Da'wa would not make an impact as an independent organization. Only after religious portions of its organization, exiled members of the Iraqi Da'wa, Islamist members of Amal, and members of other groups banded together would this conglomeration of religious activists leave a legacy. This band developed into the core of Hizbullah. Musa saw Khomeini as a theologically unorthodox radical, but these members of Amal were not as disinclined as Musa al-Sadr to accept Khomeini's ideas. It was this resistance to Khomeinism that persuaded the Iranians to build a force opposite Amal in order to spread revolutionary ideology to Lebanon (Nasr 2006, 141). Thus, the new revolutionary regime in Iran managerially and logistically supported Hizbullah's formulation. Lebanon's Shi'i community is now fully dominated by Hizbullah, the creation of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's revolutionary ideology (Nasr 2006, 141).

Iran's relationship with Hizbullah is consequently intimate, and helped on by the fact that both Iranian revolutionary clerics and Hizbullah's founding clerics had personal relationships with each other in the seminaries at Najaf. A major influence on Hizbullah is that the highest clerical authority in Lebanon, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, studied in Najaf contemporaneously with Khomeini. Ayatollah Khomeini was the declared marja' of the Hizbullah movement up until his death in 1989.

Hizbullah is the product of a group of significant events in the region. These include the dissolution of the Islamic Da'wa Party in Lebanon, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Israel's invasion was as monumental to Hizbullah's founders as was Shah's despotism to Iranian revolutionaries. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran added to the revolution's fervor in Iran, and its impact on Shi'i politics in Iran and Lebanon is comparable to that of the previous two events. It is worth noting that Israel's invasion of Lebanon would

also be compared with Hussein's invasion of Iran. It should also be noted that Israel's invasion was not targeting radical Shi'i militants, but the Palestinian Liberation Organization². The invasion, having been perceived as targeting Shi'a, was what led to the comparison with other provocative factors in the region.

Hizbullah's origins within the policies of the Iranian regime actually contributed to its divisions. Every time Ayatollah Khomeini failed to rule on an issue of theological contention, it left the organization's clerics in disarray. But Fadlallah played an important role for the Iranians by giving a Lebanese face to an essentially Iranian ideology. However, his involvement with Hizbullah is limited—in order to avoid complicating his stature and polarizing any of his constituents, he has chosen to play the role of a general leader for all Lebanese Shi'a rather than of Hizbullah in particular (Ranstorp 1997, 42). While the degree of his actual involvement in the organization has been heavily debated, many researchers find that Fadlallah's associations with Hizbullah are limited, and both he and Hizbullah have always followed a different *marja'*. Hizbullah followed Khomeini when Fadlallah followed Khoi, and now Hizbullah follows the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei while Fadlallah follows Ali Sistani. Only for a short period of time did both follow Ayatollah al-Ozma Sayyed Reza Mohammad Golpayegani, in regards to leadership and theology as a higher-ranking jurist (Jaber 1997, 70).

A key component of Fadlallah's contribution to the decentralization of the *'ulama* was his refusal to adhere to the rulings of Khomeini's successor—Ali Khamenei—following the deaths of Khoi and Golpayegani. He felt that he was more learned than Khamenei, and was not shy to proclaim his feelings. Khomeini's concessions to those who disagreed with his vision of a centralized *'ulama* were now working to reestablish the old tradition of adhering to the rulings of a single and preferred *marja'*. This also allowed Fadlallah to be more open in his criticism of the Khomeinist doctrine. He argues today that no Shi'i religious leader, in the words of Vali Nasr, “has a monopoly on the truth” and all leaders are fallible and open to criticism (Nasr 2006, 181).

The mutual independence of both Hizbullah and Fadlallah has often been confused in the past for the opposite, unity. Hizbullah denies looking to Fadlallah as its main spiritual guide and Fadlallah denies having an organizational role in Hizbullah. But the United States once suspected him of having a key role in the planning of the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut in 1983. Some scholars hold mixed views regarding his role in the organization, but reporter Thomas Friedman once quoted a source describing Fadlallah as a “façade.” Referring to his involvement in kidnappings during the Lebanese Civil

2. This contrasts with the Shah's disdain for religion and Saddam Hussein's direct targeting of the Iranian Revolutionary government with his invasion of Iran in 1980.

War, this “Shiite militia source” said of the cleric that, “he knows little about operations” (Friedman 1995, 508).

While he had at one point endorsed Ali Sistani as his *marja’ al-taqlid*, he now views himself worthy of being the greatest cleric, a seemingly arrogant assertion when set beside his other suggestion that no *marja’* is infallible (Nasr 2006, 181). But, this does not necessitate he views himself as infallible, merely a signal he now believes himself the most worthy to be a admirable *marja’*.

Bearing mention is Hassan Nasrallah’s promotion to the post of secretary general of Hizbullah in 1992. Nasrallah is not recognized as an Ayatollah, and wields more authority as a political figure than a religious one. He was one of the many clerics forced to flee Iraq in 1978 when Saddam Hussein purged Najaf’s seminaries, and was part of the contingent of clerical students who would establish Hizbullah with remnants of Amal and the Da’wa parties from Lebanon and Iraq. Under Nasrallah, Hizbullah has had to contend with the shifting geopolitical climate of the Middle East, and the group has been refocusing its priorities from Israel to domestic politics (Nakash 2006, 140). The war with Israel in the summer of 2006 can also be linked to domestic politics, as it raised Nasrallah’s popularity levels in Lebanon. It could be that the war was provoked in an effort to distract the Lebanese political culture from the overbearing issue of Hizbullah’s disarmament, which the Lebanese government had been pushing since its election (Ghattas 2006).

THE CENTRALITY OF NAJAF AND THE NEW IRAQI STATE

Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr would be Khomeini’s greatest ideological ally in Iraq, producing works that supported *velayat-e faqih* to the utmost extent. Of all his works, one that would be particularly influential to the formation of the Iranian constitution would be his *Note*, a polemic that described the ideals of the Islamic state, and was written only a week before the final collapse of the Shah’s regime in 1979. According to Chibli Mallat, this *Note* detailed what had been a general framework for the next Iranian government by Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Taleqani (Mallat 1993, 69).

Note was actually a response to requests by the *‘ulama* of Lebanon, who were looking for more details to supplement their own ideas, which would find their way into the eventual formation of Hizbullah. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr also played a major part in the formation and operations of al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya, or the Iraqi Da’wa. This explains why he would often be the one asked by members of the Lebanese *‘ulama* to discuss the details of *Velayat-e-faqih*, considering many them had received much of their theological education in Najaf and contributed to the Lebanese offshoot of the al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya.

Al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya’s origins lie in the struggle between traditionalists

and communists in Iraq during the pre-Baathist era. A prominent Ayatollah of the 1950s and 1960s, Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, issued a fatwa against communism when he saw that it was gaining influence in Baghdad. The beginnings of al-Da'wa coincided with the beginning of Islam's revival in Iraq, and it grew as a movement in the impoverished neighborhoods of what is now Sadr city, named after Muhammad Baqir himself. Interestingly, velayat-e faqih was not popular with much of al-Da'wa's constituency. However, as we shall see, Khoi's quietist legacy is leaving much more of an impact in Iraq than that of the Iraqi al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya.

Ayatollah Ali Sistani has been the key to stabilizing a fractured Iraq. When the United States entered Iraq in 2003, he was the man who called for all Shi'a not to attack U.S. forces. The result was that, when the U.S. army arrived in southern Iraq, they found it relatively tranquil and serene. American politicians may have been inclined to interpret his decree as "pro-American," but according to Vali Nasr, this was a move of Ayatollah Sistani's that would vest American trust into his community, while allowing a stable situation to take hold that could move the country toward the majority-rule democracy promised by the United States. This would allow Shi'a to take power through an electoral majority, something that could not happen if security for the occupying power was non-existent.

Sistani has actively promoted democracy in Iraq, advocating the principle of majority rule. This has not been a problem for him, because the Shi'a hold a sizable demographic advantage in Iraq, and it serves their interests for the majority to be in power. When Paul Bremer, the transitional consul for Iraq, announced plans to have a caucus-formatted election, Sistani resorted to 'people power' and staged five consecutive days of demonstrations to force Bremer into conceding a conventional one-person one-vote format. Sistani had bound the Shi'a to the "religious obligation" of voting. This eventually delivered the Shi'a a decisive victory in Iraq's first election, especially after the Sunnis decided to boycott the vote.

Sistani has never advocated the creation of an Islamic state, evidenced by his anti-Khomeinist positions. But much like pragmatists in Iran, the constitution reflected both his own fingerprints and those of the 1906–07 Iranian constitution. Interest in this earlier constitution has increased in Iran, especially among those anti-Khomeinists who like to juxtapose it with the current Iranian constitution. While it prohibits laws from being in contradiction with "Islam's jurisprudence (*Shari'a*)," the 1906 constitution stands for the principles of a democratic representative government. The fact that this model is finding success in Iraq is dangerous to the Iranian government, because it encourages Iranians to demand something equally liberal, if not more so.

Adhering to Khoi's quietest philosophy, Sistani has been careful to keep

himself personally out of the political fray. While it seems that, through his substantial advocacy he would be contravening his own principles, in truth he hardly even bends his own rules. He never advocates for clerical rule, nor does he seek power for himself. Following the customs of past clerics, he secluded himself from the general public “in protest against the lawlessness of the land” (Ajami 2006, 104). In a perfect description of Sistani’s level of involvement, Vali Nasr says of the elder cleric, “He did not attempt to add line or color, but only to provide the canvas on which the Iraqi Shi’a community could paint its future” (Nasr 2006). In other words, Sistani has merely assured that a structure exists for political freedom, while he himself is not entering the political process it creates.

Sistani’s resistance to responding to Sunni insurgent attacks against Shi’a has been paramount in delaying a major civil war. After every bombing and at nearly every pulpit, supporting clerics propagated the need to stay out of a civil war. Since February 2006, with the bombing of the Askariya Shrine in Samarra, this message has been even tougher to cultivate, but preachers continue to attempt it.

The *Shi’a* of Iraq are essentially split among three major political parties: the al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya (Iraqi Islamic Da’wa), the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and al-Jaish al-Mahdi (the Mahdi Army). Islamic Da’wa is the oldest of these groups, formed during the days of Saddam Hussein, and it is a purely domestic movement. This is in contrast to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI. Headed by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, it was formed by Iraqi exiles in Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, and fought as a militia alongside the Iranian armed forces. Al-Hakim has many personal parallels with other major clerical figures in Iraq, in the form of assassinations which have left Ayatollah Khoi’s son Majid³ and Abdul Aziz’s brother Baqir, dead. Majid al-Khoi was a confidant of Ayatollah Sistani and Baqir, who had run SCIRI prior to his death. Additionally, it is reported that the al-Hakim family has lost roughly 60 members since the rise of Saddam Hussein, giving Abdul Aziz remarkable credentials to lead the country.

SCIRI has been known for its close ties with Iran, espousing the same doctrines as the Islamic Republic. SCIRI also controls its own militia, the Badr Brigade. SCIRI rapidly jumped into the political spring that the United States unplugged with its invasion and immediately sought to fill the power vacuum. With the aid of Iran and Hizbollah, SCIRI based itself in Basra and began enforcing its will through its militia. After winning the largest share of seats in the January 2005 assembly elections, SCIRI began consolidating power by filling its share of ministries, most notably the Interior Ministry. While it has

3. It is heavily speculated that Muqtada al-Sadr ordered this killing. Paul Bremer attempted to obtain permission from Ayatollah Sistani to exhume Khoi’s body as part of the investigation from the Imam Ali Shrine. See Paul Bremer—My Year in Iraq, pp. 130 and Vali Nasr—The Shia Revival, pp. 190

shown a willingness to negotiate in national matters, the cities that SCIRI controls have been known for their strict enforcement of Islamic law and dress codes, as well as the closing of theatres and even the expulsion of Sunnis from their municipalities.

SCIRI has been the chief advocate for the right of provinces to administer autonomous regions in the country—a concept born out of the Kurdish Regional Government, that SCIRI has harnessed for its own ethnic interests. This shows an attempt by SCIRI to consolidate control over the Shi'a southern portion of Iraq. It is an idea that, if it were implemented to the fullest extent, would give Iran a more concentrated influence in a smaller, semi-autonomous Shi'i region of the country. It is likely that SCIRI is motivated by its own desire to consolidate strength in the south, while having the tacit encouragement of the Iranian government, with whom SCIRI's leaders have had ties since the group's inception.

Muqtada al-Sadr takes the opposite position to that of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, supporting a strong centralized Iraq free of foreign influence. It is somewhat ironic that he takes this position, because his Shi'i Islamism and nationalism are characteristic of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Nevertheless, he equates Iran with the United States—as an imperial powers that Iraqis must remain unified against in order to thwart its attempts at domination of the country. Al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army have already launched two full-scale revolts against US forces in Iraq.

Muqtada al-Sadr is the son of Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who was killed at the order of Saddam Hussein in 1999. He is the nephew of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who Saddam Hussein had executed in 1980. His cousin once-removed is Musa al-Sadr, who disappeared in 1978 and is speculated to have been murdered at the behest of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi. This demonstrates a suffering and familial loss similar to that faced by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and Ali Sistani, and is worth noting.

Muqtada al-Sadr followed his family's clerical philosophy of anti-quietism and chastised the political silence of senior clerics, while towing a fine political line so as not to endanger himself in the evermore turbulent environment in Iraq. His family has suffered much in the tumultuous realm of Middle Eastern politics, and Muqtada has always been very keen to highlight his losses. He portrays himself as an *ibn al-balad* or “son of the land,” irrevocably tied to the cause of the “land” and country of Iraq (Nasr 2006, 193). He was never an exile in Iran, like his political rival Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, for which al-Sadr has criticized the SCIRI leader, associating him with both escape from tribulation and a belittling view of those hailing from Iran. This was also an insult to Ali Sistani, who originally hails from Iran (Nakash 2006, 148–153).

His nationalism has inclined him to support several ideas which the

American-led Coalition would find favorable. Juxtaposed to Sunni insurgents' unwillingness to engage in the political process, it is a small comfort his insurrections have been aimed at gaining more political influence in what he has seen as a marginalizing atmosphere in the new Iraq (Nakash 2006, 148). However, his pursuit of power and willingness to chastise higher-ranking clerics has reduced the respect he might otherwise command among the Shi'i clerical community.

Muqtada al-Sadr does not command a lot of respect from the *'ulama* for several reasons. To begin with, his clerical credentials are not very impressive. He never completed his theological studies, and during his early days he had a reputation for procrastinating and video game-playing, earning him the nickname Mullah Atari (Nasr 2006, 191). He won the scorn of Ayatollah Montazeri of Iran for desecrating holy sites during his attempted takeovers in Najaf, Karbala and Kufa. Al-Sadr was attempting to control Shi'i mosques at the expense of clerics like Sistani, bullying rivals and setting up his own religious courts (Nakash 2006, 148)

The clerical rivalry has been best represented in the new Iraq by the manner in which the confrontation between the United States military and the Mahdi Army at the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf was finally concluded. As U.S. troops moved in to confront the troublesome cleric, this major battle was fought all over the city and in other areas of the country like Sadr City. When the battle entered the complex of the shrine, the Mahdi Army's fighters fortified themselves inside, initiating a standoff. Coalition authorities were determined to crush the rebellious cleric and set an example for all other militias in the country. The scale of the fighting was tremendous and endangered Shi'i religious centers, as well as the lives of citizens from several cities where the fighting was taking place. Ali Sistani returned from a medical trip to London specifically to negotiate a ceasefire with the Mahdi Army. It is believed that Sistani was counting on the US and Iraqi forces on bringing al-Sadr's influence to an end, but was persuaded to intervene due to requests from Hizbullah and his own desire not to see an important Shi'i militia destroyed during a tumultuous period of sectarian tension. Sistani's own desire for Shi'i unity and strength in Iraq was also a compelling motivation to save the Mahdi Army from annihilation.

New Jersey-centered Shi'i cleric Syed Mohsin Naquvi agrees with the description of an angry father punishing his troublesome son when speaking about the interaction between Ali Sistani and Muqtada al-Sadr. In the Shi'i clerical culture, age and experience are nearly synonymous, and the disdain showed by Muqtada for Sistani and other more senior clerics is something that is scolded, if not chaffed, among the *'ulama*.

A pattern that can be observed in the ideologies of the three strongest Middle Eastern Shi'i communities is that sectarianism is something carefully considered in the application of Islamic Law, and factors into how these different leaders interpret and apply the control by the *'ulama* in their respective countries. There are distinctions that can be made among the three countries, their Shi'i communities and those communities' leaders, which policymakers should take into account for the future. Iran, Lebanon and Iraq all have distinct characteristics that will help in confronting the challenges presented by the Iranian government, Hizbullah, and the various representatives of the Iraqi Shi'i community.

Iran's regime began in the throngs of revolution, with its foundational structure based on the unique ideology of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. It was clearly and uniquely a Shi'i ideology, even though similar notions existed in the Sunni world. But a clear demographic advantage in favor of Shi'a has not played out well for the Sunnis, who are scarcely able to advance into the government, face tremendous bureaucratic stumbling blocks to building mosques, and do not even enjoy an officially recognized religious status⁴. Economic underdevelopment of the Sunni-dominated Kurdish and Balochi regions, as well as their affiliations with these and other ethnic groups dominant in Iran's peripheral countries, have exacerbated their problems (Keddie 2006, 312). Iran's other religious minorities face similar institutional hardship, and are restricted to limited representation in government⁵.

On the other hand, Lebanon and Iraq find themselves in different atmospheres. The demographic composition of their respective countries forces them to be much more tolerant and open. Hizbullah withdrew its objective of creating an Islamic state after Syria brokered the Taif Accord that ended the Lebanese Civil War in 1989. It still maintains an objection to the Lebanese confessional system that has been preserved in Taif, essentially because it does not allow the organization to seize complete power in a majority vote (Ranstorp 1997, 43). However, many within the organization's own ranks question the feasibility of such a goal, and that is precisely why Hizbullah has abided by the Taif Accord. It is a complicated dilemma for a party founded on the premise of Shi'i revolution.

Hizbullah's pan-Islamic ideology is central to the organization, exemplified

4. The Iranian authorities would prefer not to pervade divisions in the Muslim community, in line with the vision of Khomeini of a unified Muslim community in which Shi'ism is recognized as a major school of Islamic thought parallel to the four dominant schools in Sunni Islam. However, this is both interpreted as and in practice manifested as discrimination toward the Iranian Sunni minority (Keddie 2006, 332)

5. Iran's Christians are allotted two parliamentary seats, while Jews and Zoroastrians each obtain one apiece to represent their communities. Often in the past they have been reluctant to be outspoken on major issues unless they fall within the consensus. Recent comments by the Jewish representative condemning a conference convening leading Holocaust revisionists were a rare contravention to such quietism.

by its adherence to the doctrine of *velayat-e faqih*. Hizbullah has recognized Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei as its *marj'ayyun* (plural for *marja'*), demonstrating its commitment to the concept. But this could be something that Hizbullah will have to question, or even discard, if it is to claim itself to be the vanguard of Lebanon and of all its religious communities, as it has done following the summer 2006 war with Israel.

Musa al-Sadr defended his opposition to the establishment of an Islamic state on numerous occasions. He portrayed Lebanon as a multi-confessional society in which all groups had the right to see its concerns addressed. It would not have been fair in his eyes to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon that would have been alienating for the country's Christians (Grafton 2003, 184). This alludes to the idea that on numerous occasions, he worked with senior Christian religious figures and even spoke at major Christian conferences prior to the Lebanese Civil War (Grafton 2003, 132). This represents a historical clerical support for the confessional system in Lebanon, and not the ambivalent acceptance that is shown by Fadlallah, or the clear opposition demonstrated by Hizbullah.

In Iraq, Ayatollah Ali Sistani has advocated an open democracy with free elections. While it may be true that this is partly a result of calculation—a comfortable electoral majority will always go to a strong Shi'i bloc—it also demonstrates a willingness to accept other demographics as a reality. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim has allowed SCIRI to work within the political spectrum to obtain what it wants, without any need to violate the precepts of representative democracy, by teaming his bloc with Kurdish forces in parliament to pass legislation supporting autonomous regions in a federal Iraq (Semple 2006).

Consequently, any efforts to drive permanent wedges between Shi'i and non-Shi'i communities in Iraq would probably result in the stronger application of both Shi'i law and the rule of the *'ulama* in these new respective autonomous Shi'i polities, whether in Iraq. There are two reasons why this could come about. One would be that the United States will have done this in order to make a quicker exit from Iraq, along the lines of the suggestions of Senator Joseph Biden, who advocates a three-way partition of the country for its Kurdish, Sunni Arab and Shi'i Arab demographics (Hardy 2006). The other would be Iran's support for the decentralization of Iraq and its connections to organizations applying Shi'i Islamic law.

Iran's political structure is domestically unpopular. The Iranian clerical elite would find it increasingly difficult to continue ruling with as much authority as they have if there is any successful democracy in a majority-Shi'i state like Iraq. Continued financial support for Hizbollah's operations and funding of the Lebanese reconstruction in order to build up its regional influence has fomented domestic resentment toward regime policies. Little attention has been given to events like the Iranian riots by earthquake victims in 2005 who protested

giving money to Hizbullah while they languished in despair (Kifner 2006; MacFarquhar 2006). This frustration is a growing trend in Iran, as reformists and traditionalists have rejected the radicalism of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his personal spiritual mentor Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, who is known to be vehemently anti-Sunni and has often preached against democracy (Esfandiari 2007). Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's victory in the recent vote of the Assembly of Experts indicates a major dissatisfaction with the policies of Ahmadinejad, and thus a rejection of the hard-line populist politics of the original revolutionary regime. However, a strong vote for alternative conservative candidates does not imply an overwhelming liberal or democratizing tilt in Iranian society, nor does that vote indicate an opposition to revolutionary populism.

The power relationships that Iran has built up with Shi'i organizations in Iraq—both SCIRI and the Mahdi Army—are demonstrative of Iran's attempts to control the situation on the ground. A recent Saudi government report on Iranian influence speaks of financial and military support for the Badr Brigades, demonstrating the extent of Iranian and SCIRI connections. Iran has resented the strength of Ayatollah Sistani in blocking the implementation of an Islamic state in Iraq, but has accepted his authority as a vehicle for greater Shi'i influence in the region.

The possibility of Iraq holding together and the prospects for a successful democracy have already dealt a severe blow to Iran's government. Its influence in Iraq, which has included military and logistical support for Shi'i militias, demonstrates an Iranian effort to derail that potential success. Iranian policy changes and political reform would contribute to Iraqi restoration efforts by creating a renewed cooperative effort between the West and Iran. But we can only speculate on the timeframe for such an extensive list of changes, and the rapid pace at which developments are unfolding in Iraq means that these changes would have no immediate impact on Iraqi security. Of particular interest are the rumors of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's declining health, which may allow the newly elected Assembly of Experts to select the third supreme leader in the Islamic Republic's history. The clerical rivalry between influential rightist Muhammad Mesbah-Yazdi and former president Akbar Rafsanjani would likely play out again in a race to fill the position. The election of either man would likely change the direction of the Islamic Republic's policies.

The Iraqi constitution is heavily influenced by the philosophy of Ayatollah Ali Sistani, and the unpopularity of Khomeini's "guardianship of the jurist" provides the seed for major reforms in Iran and a de-politicization of clerical culture. Iran's help for militias in Iraq may be seen as an effort to stop the Iraqi influence from producing such a result.

Many express the feeling that Ruhollah Khomeini's ideology is impractical

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